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THE FORCE OF LAW: THE ROLE OF COERCION
IN LEGAL NORMS
Ekow N. Yankah *
I. INTRODUCTION
The critical relationship between coercion and the law seems to
attract little sustained attention. The reason must be that, on the
whole, coercion appears to provide a shallow account of the na-
ture of the law. It is unsatisfying to define law as the mere ability
to enforce an edict. Classical models of jurisprudence, most nota-
bly those of John Austin and Jeremy Bentham, advanced this
crude picture of the law.1 For Austin and Bentham, laws were es-
sentially commands from a sovereign backed with threats of
force.2 This reductive picture ignored important, independent fea-
tures, such as the normative and authoritative nature of how we
experience the law. The picture conflated one form of power with
the richer social phenomenon that is the law.3 Moreover, some
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1. JOHN AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED AND THE USES OF
THE STUDY OF JURISPRUDENCE 13-14 (1954); Jeremy Bentham, Of Laws in General, in 2
THE COLLECTED WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 1-2 (H.L.A. Hart ed., 1970).
2. See AUSTIN, supra note 1, at 13-14; Bentham, supra note 1, at 54.
3. See Grant Lamond, Coercion and the Nature of Law, 7 LEGAL THEORY 35, 36-37,
54-55 (2001).
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argue focusing on the coerciveness of the law overemphasizes its
restrictive nature and obscures the constructive role the law
plays in our lives.4 Thus, modern theorists, led by H.L.A. Hart,
realized that coercion alone cannot distinguish law from threats
and discarded the classical model.5
Most would find the claim that the law is coercive uncontrover-
sial. Closer philosophical inspection, however, has caused some to
divorce the concepts of coercion and law in favor of a richer view
of the law. First, Hart and other modern theorists noted that the
law is a normative system.6 It seeks to guide human activity by
establishing a framework of norms for how one ought to behave.7
The law does not simply view punishment as a tax; one cannot
purchase the right to murder by agreeing to spend thirty years in
prison. By prohibiting murder, the law establishes that one ought
not murder. Violations of this norm, as Hart famously pointed
out, are viewed as reasons not only for punishment, but also for
blame, criticism and moral censure. Because the law is norma-
tive, legal norms are not reducible to amoral commands.
Second, the law is a system of norms that claims practical au-
thority.' The law claims to promulgate reasons that determine
how one must act, to the exclusion of all other reasons. This claim
means that legal prohibitions should not be weighed against all
other reasons, such as personal interest or the simple desire to
obey the law. The law does not permit the kind of deliberation
otherwise common in life: "Well, on the one hand, it is illegal, but
on the other. . . ." Instead, the law implicitly presumes that all
reasons have been examined and an authoritative legal decision
has been made. This position is roughly termed "the legal point of
view."9 Simply put, the law takes the position that when it tells a
person what to do, he had better darn well do it. Practically, the
conversation is over. Even where the law permits acts that are
normally violations, the exceptions themselves are regulated by
4. See Hans Oberdiek, The Role of Sanctions and Coercion in Understanding Law
and Legal Systems, 21 AM. J. JURIS. 71, 73-74 (1976).
5. See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 82-84 (1961).
6. See id.
7. See HANS KELSEN, PURE THEORY OF LAW 4 (Max Knight trans., 1967); see also J.
Raz, On the Functions of Law, in OXFORD ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE, 278, 280-81 (A.W.B.
Simpson ed., 2d ser. 1973).
8. JOSEPH RAZ, The Claims of Law, in THE AUTHORITY OF LAW: ESSAYS ON LAW AND
MORALITY 28, 29-31 (1979).
9. See JOSEPH RAZ, PRACTICAL REASON AND NORMS 139 (1975).
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the law."° Moreover, the law claims the ability to decree authori-
tative reasons over an unlimited domain of reasons; that is, the
law is "globally authoritative."
These features, normativity and authority, are notably absent
from the classical model proposed by Austin and Bentham. In dis-
carding the classical model, however, legal philosophers too often
treat coercion as peripheral to the law, thereby ignoring a critical
part of the story.
The law, after all, is not simply another normative system.
Like law, religion, morality and household rules (and many other
normative systems) all purport to bind us. Some of these norma-
tive systems aspire to exert exclusive force over our practical mo-
rality. All systems within this subset, including the law, claim to
be supreme normative systems. In contrast to other systems of
norms, however, the law's claim of authority is enforced and used
to justify sanctions. If coercion by itself does not explain the law,
there remains the nagging suspicion that dismissing coercion too
quickly leaves something important amiss.
This article will show that coercion is not merely important in
light of human nature 1 and will make the stronger claim that co-
ercive sanctions are a necessary and perhaps the most important
feature for explaining legal norms. The emphasis will be on the
legal aspect of legal norms. The ability to use coercion under spe-
cial conditions defines legal norms. Legal philosophy is, to borrow
a phrase, philosophy with bayonets.
That coercion is needed in human societies as a pragmatic mat-
ter does not answer the question of what is conceptually neces-
10. For example, the law allows some people, often called conscientious objectors, to
opt out of certain forms of compliance for personal, moral reasons. See JOSEPH RAZ, A
Right to Dissent? I. Civil Disobedience, in THE AUTHORITY OF LAW, supra note 8, at 262,
262-63; JOSEPH RAz, A Right to Dissent? II. Conscientious Objection, supra note 8, at 276,
285-87.
11. Even legal scholars who have seemingly placed coercion within the concept of law
have left it in this contingent role. For example, Hart deems sanctions and coercion neces-
sary as a guarantee against disobedience. The further fact that Hart excludes from this
requirement close knit communal societies seems to leave coercion short of a conceptual
necessity. HART, supra note 5, at 193. Raz, notwithstanding language that appears to ele-
vate coercion to a conceptual necessity, both restricts his definition of coercion to a much
smaller realm than mine and, similar to Hart, regards coercion as an important part of
others' motivation to obey the law. JOSEPH RAZ, THE CONCEPT OF A LEGAL SYSTEM: AN
INTRODUCTION TO THE THEORY OF LEGAL SYSTEM 186 (2d ed. 1980). As will be explored,
Raz's view has evolved over the years.
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sary in law. One may wonder why the fact that coercion is prag-
matically necessary is insufficient if the most basic portrait of
human beings includes the need for coercion in the law, there ap-
pears no reason why one cannot be satisfied with the necessary
connection between the law and coercion in human societies and
quit any further pursuit. Is it not sufficient to note that coercion
is necessary in all nomologically possible worlds?
One initial impulse is to shrug and admit that our philosophi-
cal curiosity often far exceeds sensible thinking. Still, the claim of
necessity is at the very heart of the concept of law. Our concept of
law would be incomplete, and perhaps undefined, without under-
standing that coercion constitutes at least part of it.
To tease out this claim, the concept of coercion must be defined.
Particularly, one must not confuse the coerciveness of law with
the fact that the law is backed by sanctions. Though sanctions are
obviously important to legal coercion, they alone do not establish
the law as coercive, nor is the law unique in being backed by
sanctions. Rather, the ideas of sanctions and coercion are separa-
ble. Coercion must be understood as an independent concept and,
ultimately, may always be subject to a sort of moral weighing.
Moreover, the law is experienced as coercive in two layers: its
ability to level coercive sanctions and its ability to coercively en-
force its sanctions.' 2 Thus, the resulting claim is a demanding
one: Legal norms must be ultimately enforceable by coercion to be
included in the core concept of the law.
This article will also make the positive argument that coercion
is best seen as an inherent part of the law; coercion individuates
the law as a normative system. While the classic models of Austin
and Bentham ignored the law's normitivity and authority, it is
important to rescue their insight that the law is inherently coer-
cive. Quite simply, the law must include three features: establish-
ing a system of norms, laying claim to global authority, and pos-
sessing coercive power. The claim is not that coercion is necessary
because of human nature or wickedness but that coercion is con-
ceptually necessary to delineate the law.
Though a modest picture of law, this model sheds light on the
current legal landscape. When one understands that the ability to
12. To be clear, the law may both impose coercive sanctions and may coercively en-
force trivial, non-coercive sanctions.
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coercively enforce authoritative norms is critical to legal norms,
the status of some portion of international law is thrown into
doubt. For example, where no provisions exist that enforce inter-
national regulations, this model recasts those regulations as aspi-
rational norms instead of proper laws. In order to explore these
ideas in a less abstract setting, this article will examine how an
international court addressed this conception of the law when it
attempted to determine identity of a legal regime. 3
Finally, defining coercion as a necessary feature of law reminds
us of the law's dangerous power and its need for constant justifi-
cation. This article will purposefully avoid asserting the condi-
tions that would morally justify the law's coerciveness in full. In-
stead, it will focus on establishing and stressing the inherently
coercive nature of law. Coercion, far from being an artifact of hu-
man frailty, is inseparable from our concept of law. So long as the
law exists, its coerciveness lays a moral burden on all. The posi-
tivist account of the law has long encouraged citizens to view it as
separate from morality, thus subjecting the law to critical moral
judgment. 4 Viewing the law as coercive puts the charge in a dif-
ferent way: if the law is inherently coercive then, considering that
coercion prima facie requires justification, the law requires vigi-
lant challenging and never-ending inspection and justification.
Because the law plays a distinctive and hugely important role
in the ordering of human affairs, highlighting its inherent coer-
cive element imposes an important moral burden. Asserting that
the law is coercive isolates a particular way it treats people;
namely, the law imposes a non-voluntary normative system on
people. This non-voluntary aspect places certain political and
moral restraints on the law and requires the legal system to con-
form to certain justificatory reasons. The law's coerciveness does
not simply require justification; it limits and shapes the type of
moral justification. '"
While this article will not explore the particular boundaries a
legal system must observe to be justified, establishing that the
law is inherently coercive is an important first step in under-
standing why the law is so properly restrained. That this explica-
13. Interesting analogies can be drawn to help understand cases in which systems of
aboriginal law, too often slighted, should be understood as fully functioning legal systems.
14. See HART, supra note 5, at 207.
15. See H.L.A. Hart, Are There Any Natural Rights?, in THEORIES OF RIGHTS 77, 88-89
(Jeremy Waldron ed., 1984).
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tion highlights an essential moral feature of the law-the neces-
sity of morally justifying the law and why that justification may
be restricted in certain ways-further counts in its favor. The at-
tempt here is not to bootstrap the truth of the argument by un-
derscoring an attractive consequence. If the argument is persua-
sive, however, the fact that it also points out critically important
implications surely renders it more attractive.
Those familiar with jurisprudence will immediately note that
this article builds on an explicitly positivist model of law. Given
that every inch of the field seems afflicted with trench warfare, it
is probably useless to offer that this article builds on such thin
propositions that nearly all will, at the least, have access to the
arguments. The bulk of the following claims do not intend to take
a deep position on an issue that has worried legal philosophers
for a few generations-the status of morality or principles in legal
norms. Thus, this article does not defend the choice of a positivist
framework in any strong way.
While this article claims that normativity, authority, and coer-
cion are necessary aspects of the law, it explicitly takes no stand
as to whether they are sufficient. Further, this article does not
undertake the formidable task of defending the methods em-
ployed. It will not defend at great length the basic idea that de-
scriptive jurisprudence or conceptual analysis is possible. Ulti-
mately, the positions adopted here do have interesting
implications for these questions. At the risk of contributing fur-
ther to an already thick discourse, I will outline some of the im-
plications my view has for the questions that have been at the
heart modern jurisprudence. It is my hope that understanding
the law as necessarily coercive will shed new and interesting light
on this debate.
Part II begins with a brief description of the reductive, classical
model, which defined a law simply as a command from a sover-
eigu that was coercively enforced. Part III notes the additions of-
fered by Hart, illustrating that the law is normative. Part IV ad-
dresses the further point that as a normative system, the law
claims global authority; it claims authority to dispositively dis-
place one's other reasons for action. Having noted that the law
need be normative and authoritative, Part V elucidates this
model of coercion explicitly based on Aristotle's conception of co-
ercion. It also addresses the most widely held and powerful objec-
tions to the concept that the law is inherently coercive. Part VI
constructs the positive case for viewing the law as coercive, dem-
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onstrating that normativity and authority are insufficient to de-
lineate legal norms. Part VII briefly notes the implications this
more robust theory has for our real world conceptions of the law,
examining how the model leads us to reconceptualize fields such
as international law. Part VIII shows how understanding that the
law is coercive sheds much needed new light on a generation of
heavily contested jurisprudence between positivist, interpretivist
and natural lawyers. It also has powerful implications for modern
political theory, particularly, the manner in which the law can be
justified.
II. THE LAW AS COERCION: THE CLASSICAL MODEL
The simplest jurisprudential model exploring the relationship
between coercion and the law largely equates the two. This
model, proposed by Austin and Bentham, sought to delineate the
law from other systems.16 Austin describes the law first as a
group of stable imperatives or commands. Commands, in turn,
are the expression of a wish containing the threat of an accompa-
nying evil or sanction for its violation. 7 Only because one is liable
to be sanctioned for violating a command does he have a duty to
obey that command.'" Accordingly, the greater the sanction, the
greater the strength of the duty.'9 In this model, the notions of
command, sanction and duty are inseparable.2" It is important to
note that a sanction does not merely ensure the effectiveness of
the command; rather, it is the sanction itself that imposes a duty:
The greater the eventual evil, and the greater the chance of incur-
ring it, the greater is the efficacy of the command, and the greater is
the strength of the obligation: Or (substituting expressions exactly
equivalent), the greater is the chance that the command will be
obeyed, and that the duty will not be broken. But where there is the
smallest chance of incurring the smallest evil, the expression of a
wish amounts to a command, and, therefore, imposes a duty. The
sanction, if you will, is feeble or insufficient; but still there is a sanc-
tion, and, therefore, a duty and a command. 21
16. See AUSTIN, supra note 1, at 13-14; Bentham, supra note 1, at 54.
17. AUSTIN, supra note 1, at 13-15.
18. Id. at 13-14.
19. Id. at 16.
20. Id. at 17-18.
21. Id. at 16.
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Austin views the law as little more than a set of stable com-
mands, backed by the threat of sanctions addressed to a general
class.22 It follows from Austin's conceptualization that commands
without attached sanctions are not properly called laws.23 Austin
describes such commands as "imperfect laws."24 Without the
threat of sanctions, such dictates cannot be properly character-
ized as commands and cannot give rise to any duty or obliga-
tion.2"
By defining laws as commands attached with the threat of
sanctions, Austin's model excludes other normative systems that
are often conflated with, or compete for recognition as, legal
norms. Specifically, Austin distinguishes between laws of custom
and laws that are properly considered legal.26 While Austin rec-
ognizes that a breach of customary norms may result in social
sanctions, to the extent that those sanctions are not ultimately
enforceable by state power, they are not properly considered laws:
At its origin, a custom is a rule of conduct which the governed ob-
serve spontaneously, or not in pursuance of a law set by a political
superior. The custom is transmuted into positive law, when it is
adopted as such by the courts of justice, and when the judicial deci-
sions fashioned upon it are enforced by the power of the state. But
before it is adopted by the courts, and clothed with the legal sanc-
tion, it is merely a rule of positive morality: a rule generally observed
by the citizens or subjects; but deriving the only force, which it can
be said to possess from the general disapprobation falling on those
who transgress it.7
22. Id. at 19, 24.
23. See id. at 27-28.
24. Id.
25. Id. Austin notes that there are potential uses of the term "imperfect law" that
equate perfect laws to non-legal norms and, thus, give rise to non-legal duties, be they re-
ligious or moral:
The imperfect laws, of which I am now speaking, are laws which are imper-
fect, in the sense of the Roman jurists: that is to say, laws which speak the
desires of political superiors, but which their authors (by oversight or design)
have not provided with sanctions. Many of the writers on morals, and on the
so called law of nature, have annexed a different meaning to the term imper-
fect. Speaking of imperfect obligations, they commonly mean duties which are
not legal: duties imposed by commands of God, or duties imposed by positive
morality, as contradistinguished to duties imposed by positive law. An imper-
fect obligation, in the sense of the Roman jurists, is exactly equivalent to no
obligation at all.
Id. at 28.
26. See id. at 135.
27. Id. at 31; see also id. at 122-25. Austin does not make the distinction between a
1202 [Vol. 42:1195
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Thus, while social sanctions may be powerful enough to assure
one's obedience and regulate a group's behavior, they still only
render social norms analogous to law.28
Similarly, Bentham proposes that one cannot conceive of a le-
gal mandate unless it coercively binds its subjects: "[A] law by
which nobody is coerced . . . [is a] contradiction [ ] in terms."2 9
Specifically, Bentham notes that regardless of whether the bur-
den a law imposes is trivial or onerous, that burden is coercively
imposed.3 °
According to Bentham, only insofar as the law is coercive can it
affect citizens' practical reasoning and thus produce any benefit;
coercion makes law "efficient."3' But like Austin, Bentham con-
ceives of the law's coerciveness as more than a practically contin-
gent function needed to guarantee the law's effectiveness. Rather,
Bentham conceives of the efficacy that coercion imposes in a
deeper sense; it is the very duty-imposing feature of the law.32
The efficacy turns a command into a law, which, in turn imposes
duties and confers legal rights.33 Thus, that coercion binds legal
subjects is as critical to constructing a legal mandate as the pur-
pose of the law's creation. Both are necessary to the very concep-
tualization of a legal norm:
On the circumstance of there being a party whom it binds, a law de-
pends for its essence: on the circumstance of there being a party
whom it is designed at least to favour, it depends for its cause: on
both together it depends for the sum total of its efficacy: without the
last it never exists; without the first it could not so much as be con-
ceived. 34
legal and a social sanction dependent on the severity of the legal sanction or the force and
effect of the social sanction on the person. Rather, the distinction depends on the source of
the sanction. Whatever sanction is leveled at a person as a result of violating a social or
customary norm, it does not result from the command of a political superior. See id. at
133-35. Austin's distinction, however, does not fully capture the necessary claim of au-
thority by the law. While a political superior by its nature claims authority, that claim is
not limited to a political superior. Religious and moral norms often claim an authoritative
position in one's practical reasoning.
28. See id. at 154-55.
29. Bentham, supra note 1, at 54.
30. Id. at 54-55.
31. Id. at 57.
32. Id. at 58.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 63.
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Thus, the classical model, as constructed by Austin and Bentham
quite straightforwardly ties coercion to legal norms. Legal norms
are more or less commands backed with the threat of coercive
force.
It is easy to see why modern theorists reject the classical, re-
ductive account of coercion in legal norms. The mere ability to co-
erce another cannot be suitably described as law. An older
brother, a bully on the playground and a back-alley mugger may
all be quite capable of forcing others to obey their will. They may
also issue commands backed by attached sanctions. Yet none of
these instances should be given the name of law. Moreover, at-
taching coercion to a particular actor, the sovereign, does little to
resolve the issue.
This intuition is correct. Simply being able to compel actions
through coercive pressure cannot amount to law. Coercion is only
one form of exercising power over another. The classical model,
absent further conditions, merely illustrates the exercise of social
power over others, which is not properly described as law. Power,
in this respect, is a broader concept than coercion.35
35. Bertrand Russell defined power as "the production of intended effects." BERTRAND
RUSSELL, POWER: A NEW SOCIAL ANALYSIS 23 (2004). This definition, while focused, is
overly narrow. Though we are most often concerned with the use of power in human or
social contexts, there are natural and other non-human forms of power. To say, "The storm
was powerful" does not seem like a metaphorical way of speaking, though it would be diffi-
cult to imagine, without positing that a god controls the weather, that the storm has any
intended effect. This language suggests that power is connected with the ability to force
change even amidst resistance.
The overly broad sweep of formulation, of course, presents problems. The central case of
power is social power, exerted to make others conform to an individual or institutional
will. Yet, the armed lunatic or the suicide bomber may cause a great deal of change, de-
spite resistance, but represent problematic cases of power. More precisely then, power is
the ability to compel change. The suicide bomber does not seek to exert control over others,
but wishes to singularly force a change in the environment. Notice that the bomber, as op-
posed to the armed robber, does not compel others; there is no wish to have anyone comply
with his will. This represents a borderline case of exhibiting power and is perhaps best
recognized as such.
Defining power as the ability to compel change avoids a definition which turns on the
dependence of one person (or group), the dependent, on the behavior of another person, the
controlling unit. Robert Dahl, Power as the Control of Behavior, in POWER 40 (Steven
Lukes ed., 1986). Dahl's definition provides no specific guidance on how to distinguish be-
tween the controlling unit and the dependent (the controlled unit). A boss wishing to
channel her workers must react to their development. Thus, her behavior depends in real
part on their actions. Yet the power relationship of interest may be precisely the opposite
one. Nor should the conception of power be tied too closely with the bare concept of over-
coming resistance. Many forms of power depend not on overcoming resistance but on re-
moving it. Russell recognizes the case of coercively overcoming resistance as a particular
[Vol. 42:11951204
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Power is a broad concept, and the law may exercise its power in
many ways. Coercion represents but one manner of manipulating
the will of others and, thus, is but one form of social power.36 One
may exercise power over people due to physical strength, enor-
mous wealth, social position or personal charisma.37 Indeed, the
law, unlike the purely reductive picture presented, often exerts
its power by being normatively internalized by its subjects.
There are at least three important ways in which raw power
and the type of normative sanction that is the crux of the law di-
verge. First, having brute power over someone does not equate to
possessing normative power over that person.38 Being able to
compel someone, by brute strength alone, to stay inside does not
mean the bully claims that the victim ought to stay inside or that
the victim thinks he ought to stay inside (except prudentially to
avoid being pummeled).39
Second, power need not claim authority over its subject. The
robber does not need to believe he has a justified right to com-
mand his victim. Certainly, he does not believe the individual
whom he is robbing has a duty to obey him to the exclusion of
other reasons. This is why the robber carries a gun.
form of power only, "naked power." See RUSSELL, supra, at 26. Cases remain where one
persuades, "educates," or trains others to respond to their will. Because power is the abil-
ity to compel one to serve another's will, and human beings are intentional creatures,
power, in a social sense, is easily aligned with Russell's "production of intended conse-
quences." Id. at 40, 46-48; see also MAX WEBER, THE THEORY OF SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC
ORGANIZATION 152-53 (Talcott Parsons ed., 1957); Lamond, supra note 3, at 55.
36. See Lamond, supra note 3, at 50-51. Talcott Parsons presents a contrasting view,
explicitly denying that coercion itself represents a form of power. This view is based on
Parsons' rather thick definition of power. Parsons' interest in political power leads him to
exclusively focus on normative and legitimized coercion as the paradigmatic form of power.
In this respect, Parsons recalls Weber's focus on "legitimate" power. The definition Par-
sons forwards-power relies on legitimized authority, which is ultimately reinforced by
coercion-though explicitly a political definition, is complementary to this article's defini-
tion of legal power. Talcott Parsons, Power and the Social System, in POWER, supra note
35, at 103-04, 125.
37. See R.B. Friedman, On the Concept of Authority in Political Philosophy, in
AUTHORITY 56, 70-71 (Joseph Raz ed., 1990); see also ALAN WERTHEIMER, COERCION 292-
93 (1987) (discussing persuasion and manipulation as various forms of power).
38. R.P. Wolff, The Conflict Between Authority and Autonomy, in AUTHORITY, supra
note 37, at 20-21; see Joseph Raz, Authority and Justification, 14 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 3, 4
(1985).
39. JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT AND DISCOURSES 168 (J.H.
Brumfitt and John C. Hall eds., G.D.H. Cole trans., J.M. Dent & Sons, Ltd. 1973) (1762).
Rousseau stated, "Force is a physical power, and I fail to see what moral effect it can have.
To yield to force is an act of necessity, not of will-at the most, an act of prudence. In what
sense can it be a duty?" Id.
2008] 1205
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Third, coercion alone need not be part of an act-guiding or nor-
mative enterprise and, thus, need not be a sanction. The robber
does not mug you because you did something; he simply mugs
you. This is a logical extension of the earlier observation that
brute strength is not normative. To be sure, raw power may be
used as a sanction; the bully may beat you up because you did not
follow his long-standing dictate to hand over your daily lunch
money. But, of course, the bully may just beat you up.
Thus, the objection to the reductive picture of the relationship
between coercion and the law holds true. The mere ability to force
others to do as one wishes cannot be enough to make something
the law. That ability does not pretend to lay down systematic or
stable norms, to enforce those norms or to claim authority. Where
any particular instance of brute force claims all three, its very na-
ture changes.
Still, in exposing the flaws of the classical model, legal theo-
rists have often been led to believe that coercion is only contin-
gently linked to the law-a human necessity that does not define
the intrinsic nature of the law. While it is necessary to supple-
ment Austin and Bentham's views, it is a mistake to conceive co-
ercion as merely contingently linked to the law. Rather, we must
explore first the missing features needed to fully describe legal
norms. Only after examining the other features of legal norms
can we examine the role coercion plays in fully describing legal
norms. The classical model Austin and Bentham drew can be
completed without losing sight of the importance of coercion as
intrinsic to the law.
To complete the classical model, it is critical to realize that the
law is a normative system and that it claims practical authority.
Both subjects are themselves deep topics on which volumes have
been written.4 ° Briefly discussing them may generate more ques-
tions than answers. Still, even a cursory discussion will supply
the distinctions needed to individuate a viable concept of law and
provide the platform from which we can explore our main focus,
coercion's unique role.
40. See, e.g., HANS KELSEN, GENERAL THEORY OF LAW AND STATE 175-77 (Anders
Wedberg trans., Russell & Russell 1961) (1945); JOSEPH RAz, Authority, Law, and Moral-
ity, in ETHICS IN THE PUBLIC DOMAIN: ESSENCE IN THE MORALITY OF LAW AND POLITICS
194, 195-96 (1994).
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III. THE LAW AS A NORMATIVE SYSTEM
The law is plainly a normative system. Like all normative sys-
tems, it seeks to guide human activity by establishing how one
"ought" to act. Obviously, not all laws are first-order norms. 41
Many laws, for example, a time limit on appealing one's income
tax, modify other legal norms or create permissive norms by
which one may undertake legal duties.42 But, taken as a whole,
the law cannot be understood without recognizing that it is a sys-
tem of norms.
When a law, or any other norm for that matter, comes into be-
ing, it purports to guide human behavior. 3 It establishes what
one "ought" to do by some system or body of norms. This "ought"
is meant to describe what one should do objectively, quite apart
from the subjective will of the issuer, the addressee or a third
party.4 4
Norms may exist in many different systems. There are moral,
religious and custom-based norms. For example, in most every
home there exists a set of norms that attempt to direct the behav-
ior of its members.45 Some norms, like the law, may come into ex-
istence instantaneously. 6 In other cases, a norm may emerge
slowly, such as with custom or may be a matter of from philoso-
41. See Joseph Raz, Legal Principles and the Limits of Law, 81 YALE L. J. 823, 835
(1972).
42. Thus, a posited legal norm does not always create a complete norm. See id.; HART,
supra note 5, at 27.
43. See KELSEN, supra note 7, at 4-5; see also RAZ, , supra note 9, at 124-25; JOSEPH
RAZ, The Rule of Law and its Virtue, in THE AUTHORITY OF LAW, supra note 8, at 210, 213-
14.
44. KELSEN, supra note 7, at 7-9. The creation of a norm establishes a directive as to
how one "ought" to behave. This "ought" exists within the legal, moral, religious, or other
relevant normative system. As Kelsen describes, the "ought" exists objectively, that is, the
norm creates an objective "ought." This "ought" exists apart from the subjective will of the
issued directive. Independent from a command or wish, a norm is a valid directive accord-
ing to the normative system in which it is placed:
It is, however, necessary to distinguish the subjective and the objective mean-
ing of the act. "Ought" is the subjective meaning of every act of will directed
at the behavior of another. But not every such act has also objectively this
meaning; and only if the act of will has also the objective meaning of an
"ought," is this "ought" called a "norm."
Id. at 7.
45. See RAz, supra note 9, at 107.
46. See KELSEN, supra note 7, at 8. A legal norm may depend on or reference other
legal norms to complete it or other supervening norms to legitimate it. See RAZ, supra note
11, at 70-71.
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phical or theological dispute, as is the case with moral and reli-
gious norms.47
Hart recognized the objective (normative) nature of the "ought"
in a legal system in delineating between being obliged and having
an obligation.4" In Hart's terms, being obliged is being forced to
do something.49 An obligation, however, exists independently re-
gardless of whether the person escapes detection, incurs sanc-
tions, or feels or believes he has an obligation.5 ° This definition of
obligation gives rise to Hart's famous internal point of view. In
fact, this is one of the central ways in which we express obliga-
tions. Arguing that one has an obligation under a valid and valu-
able normative system is often important to correct someone's
lack of conviction or belief in their duty.51
The normative picture of the law helps us distinguish the role
of norms from the mere presence of commands backed by force.
As Hans Kelsen describes, a valid norm creates an objective
"ought." 2 The will of another, the gunman, for example, merely
creates a subjective "ought" or "will."53 Ronald Dworkin describes
this distinction:
47. See KELSEN, supra note 7, at 9.
48. HART, supra note 5, at 80.
49. Id. at 6; see also KELSEN, supra note 7, at 114-19. Perhaps the confusing distinc-
tion would have been clear if Hart substituted "compelled" for "obliged."
50. HART, supra note 5, at 85-86.
51. See id. at 85; Wolff, supra note 38, at 21.
52. See KELSEN, supra note 7, at 118-19.
53. See generally D.N. MacCormick, Legal Obligation and the Imperative Fallacy, in
OXFORD ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 7, at 100, 109-12. The important distinc-
tion here is between a subjective posited will and an objective norm; one must not conflate
the two. As MacCormick notes, acts of will do not always posit an "ought." As was true in
Kelsen's example of the robber, MacCormick argues that this also applies to most issued
commands. A command is simply the issuance of a desired action by someone in a position
of superiority, which is intended to communicate his wish. Merely issuing a command
(positing an act of will), however, does not necessarily mean positing an "ought." Nor does
telling someone what he "ought" to do presuppose the issuance of a command:
It is perfectly clear that no command is normally involved when one person
tells another what he ought to do; for example, when a solicitor advises his
client that he ought not to defraud the Inland Revenue.... Conversely, it
would be highly unusual, though not quite impossible, to give a command by
using the auxiliary "ought."
Id. at 109. From this, MacCormick points out that, in much the same way "ought" cannot
be derived from "is," it cannot be derived from "shall." Id. at 100.
MacCormick's clarification should not lead us to minimize the role of mixed com-
mands, both within and outside legal settings. Though MacCormick is right that a com-
mand is the positing of a "shall," many commands have normative components. These
components appear in one of two ways. First, many commands are straightforwardly
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We make an important distinction between law and even the general
orders of a gangster. We feel that the law's strictures-and its sanc-
tions-are different in that they are obligatory in a way that the out-
law's commands are not. Austin's analysis has no place for any such
distinction, because it defines an obligation as subjection to the
threat of force, and so founds the authority of law entirely on the
sovereign's ability and will to harm those who disobey....
.... [But a] rule differs from an order, among other ways by being
normative, by setting a standard of behavior that has a call on its
subject beyond the threat that may enforce it. A rule can never be
binding just because some person with physical power wants it to be
SO.54
Indeed, the gunman himself does not imagine he is issuing
normative commands.55 The law, by contrast, lays down norms
that guide behavior. These norms exist independently of the ac-
companying threat of force.56 In this way, the law, like all norma-
tive systems, posits an "ought" guides one's behavior, and criti-
cizes nonconformity. These norms stand as an objective "ought" in
the world and establish obligations and duties apart from force or
fear of detection.57
based on normative propositions. "Thou shall not murder" is on its face a command, but
few would fail to realize that it receives its force from the normative proposition "thou
ought not murder." Second, most commands are typically founded on the presumption of
moral good in the institution authorized to issue those commands. Hence, when a general
orders his troops to attack a hill, he means that he wishes them to take the hill, that they
ought to take the hill (because of the moral good connected to the military campaign), and
that they ought to obey his order (to serve the values preserved by a well ordered mili-
tary). It is perfectly common for most commands to be imbued with these normative lay-
ers.
MacCormick's point that a command need not necessarily posit an "ought," clarifies
Kelsen's model. Commands do not necessarily, but often do, carry a normative element. As
noted earlier, when legal systems posit directives, these directives are posited normative
statements and are explicitly differentiated from mere commands. See KELSEN, supra note
7, at 114-15. Hence when the legal system issues a legal prohibition, the law posits both
that one ought not commit the prohibited act and that one is commanded not to commit
the prohibited act.
54. RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 19-20 (1978); see also Wolff, supra
note 38, at 20-21.
55. It would be peculiar for the gunman to say, "You ought to hand over your money
or I will shoot you." It would be even more bizarre if he said, "If you do not hand over your
money I ought to shoot you." Simply put, the gunman does not (and does not attempt to)
guide your actions by addressing you with norms. His commands are meant to simply
compel your immediate obedience. The force of his directive ends as soon as the threat of
his force abates. The special case of the gunman who issues imperatives embedded in a
normative framework of his own will be explored later.
56. DWORKIN, supra note 54, at 19-20.
57. This article leaves many important issues surrounding norms untouched. When
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IV. THE LAW AS AUTHORITATIVE
The law is not merely normative, but is a particular type of
normative system in that it claims authority. The law does not
contain a system of normative rules with the caveat, "Do what-
ever you like."
What does it mean to define something as an authority? Au-
thority is the notion that certain reasons-authoritative rea-
sons-preclude independent deliberation of their underlying pro-
positions. One has authority over another when his dictates
prevent the other from weighing other reasons to act. As the old
line goes, "Because I said so. . . ." Thomas Hobbes touches on this
type of authority in his discussion of commands.59 He defines an
authoritative command as "where a man saith, Doe this, or Doe
not this, without expecting other reason than the Will of him that
sayes it."6
Joseph Raz offers the most sophisticated elucidation of practi-
cal authority.6' According to Raz, a practical authority is one that
can preclude or constrain consideration of certain other reasons
one describes a norm possessing an "ought," is this "ought" real? Does it actually obligate
or is it merely believed to be obligating by actors within a particular normative system?
Are norms action-guiding, or can there be right-making norms, norms about what one's
goals "ought" to be? These issues involve deep jurisprudential debates and deserve their
own full treatment. The thin foundation just discussed above, however, is sufficient to
support the work ahead.
58. RAZ, supra note 40, at 212-15; Raz, supra note 38, at 7-8, 10. In this sense, au-
thority can be both practical and theoretical. Theoretical authority provides reasons for
belief rather than reasons for action. Someone possessing theoretical authority has suffi-
cient knowledge in a field, such that his pronouncements give reason to believe the content
of the pronouncement, without further deliberation.
For example, if Gary Kasparov is an authority on chess, when he says something about
a chess move, no one longer needs to independently investigate the truth of that state-
ment; the statement precludes his or her independent consideration. Note that Kasparov's
theoretical authority over reasons for belief will then influence reasons for action. Kas-
parov does not merely possess theoretical authority, but, to the extent one wants to win
the game, his theoretical authority provides reasons for making the suggested move.
Of course Kasparov is not necessarily an authority for all people, most notably his col-
leagues, who are world-class chess players. Thus, a person could be a theoretical author-
ity, but be unrecognized in their time.
Practical authority is, by the same token, authoritative as to practical matters regarding
what one should do.
59. THoMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 127 (Richard E. Flatham & David Johnston eds.,
1997).
60. Id. (emphasis in the original).
61. See, e.g., RAZ, supra note 40, at 212-25; JOSEPH RAZ, Legitimate Authority, in THE
AUTHORITY OF LAW, supra note 8, at 21-25.
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one has for acting.6 2 The authority does not merely add to or pro-
vide sufficient reasons to act in a particular way but alters the
domain of reasons for which one may act at all.63 Further, one
recognizes authority only if one's behavior is, in fact, guided by
that authority. One must behave in the manner the authority
prescribes because the authority decreed it.64 To be sure, most
people do not accept or understand the law as unquestionably au-
thoritative. Rather, they believe that the law's claim to authority
can be outweighed by its moral repugnance, especially in extreme
cases. Notwithstanding this belief, the law (or any authority)
views itself as promulgating authoritative reasons.
One may object to Raz's conception of authority on several
grounds. How can law claim authority? How can a moral agent
subordinate his agency to another's authority? What is the func-
tion of the law's claim to authority? When is a claim of authority
justified?65
More central to this article is whether the nature of the law
must claim authority over an unlimited dominion. Many founda-
tional legal documents in the world today-the United States
Constitution is one example-contain provisions that limit the
scope of laws that may be enacted.66 In powerful ways, these
documents surrender their ability to claim authority over a cer-
tain range of reasons, including particular religious practices and
62. See RAZ, supra note 61, at 25.
63. Id. at 22-24. If an authority decrees that cost will not be considered in lifesaving
medical procedures, then that authority, if followed, excludes all cost considerations from
life saving medical procedures. Other reasons, however, may be considered: the need of
others, the age of the patient, or the doctor's golf schedule. Alternatively, when one exer-
cises complete authority over a decision, no other reasons may be weighed.
An authoritative institution that demands that one act based on certain reasons does
not truly preclude him from considering other reasons. For instance, if a child takes his
mother to be an authority and she confines him to his room, he need not stay in his room if
the house catches on fire. Her order was not meant to exclude exceptional reasons like the
house catching on fire. In some situations, even excluded reasons may be considered. Such
consideration, however, must not influence one's practical consideration--consideration of
his actions. If considered at all, deliberation must remain purely academic in nature.
64. See RAZ, supra note 40, at 213-15. It is not enough for one to move to New York
when ordered if he was planning on doing so in any case or his reasons for moving have
nothing to do with the order.
65. These important questions have given rise to much debate that cannot be ad-
dressed here. For our purposes we need only the plausible starting claim that law claims
authority.
66. E.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
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First Amendment speech. Only a peculiar notion of law would ex-
clude the entirety of the liberal Western legal systems.67
Hart suggests the beginning of our answer. Hart notes that the
restriction of the law's authority simply reflects the social prac-
tice of placing limits on the domain of reasons the legal system
may exclude.6" This reflects a social practice of law within a par-
ticular legal system, not a conceptual necessity of law wherever
one may find it.
Kelsen complements Hart's view by noting that the law regu-
lates its own creation. Thus, while the range of its authority may
be limited, these limits are created by the law itself.69 Raz, also
expanding on this view, proposes that the law remains norma-
tively authoritative by regulating behavior outside its limits. In
these situations, the law regulates by permitting the protected
behavior. 0
67. The problem of internally limited law led Hart to be skeptical about Hobbes's
views of legal authority. See HART, supra note 5, at 68-69. Hart notes that where such re-
strictions exist, they limit the law-making power of the law-postulating sovereign. Restric-
tive limitations are not properly conceived as creating duties for officials to avoid creating
illegitimate law. Rather, they represent limits on the ability to create certain laws. When
the law-making body abrogates these limits, it fails to create a valid law; only conforming
enactments represent valid law.
Some very sophisticated conceptualizations of sovereign authority may be constructed to
save the view that the law is unlimited in its authority. Under this view, the law's author-
ity is splintered into various legal branches (e.g., legislative, judicial, and executive) that
are sovereign when performing their functions yet stand subject to each other in certain
respects. Taken as a whole, however, these branches would be a sovereign and authorita-
tive figure. Robert Ladenson, In Defense of a Hobbesian Conception of Law, 9 PHIL. & PUB.
AFF. 134, 153-56 (1980).
It is doubtful that such complicated notions resolve the tension between the limits of au-
thoritative commands and the idea that the law must claim ultimate authority. Whether it
revives certain conceptions of the law (the Hobbesian sovereign), it still does not explain
how rights that may not be governed may now exist.
68. HART, supra note 5, at 68-69; see also H.L.A. HART, Commands and Authoritative
Legal Reasons, in ESSAYS ON BENTHAM: STUDIES IN JURISPRUDENCE AND POLITICAL
THEORY 243, 258-59 (1982).
69. HANS KELSEN, INTRODUCTION TO THE PROBLEMS OF LEGAL THEORY 56-57 (Bonnie
Litschewski Paulson & Stanley L. Paulson trans., 1992); see also JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL
LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS 268 (1980); KELSEN, supra note 7, at 12-15.
70. See JOSEPH RAz, The Institutional Nature of Law, in THE AUTHORITY OF LAW, su-
pra note 8, at 103, 116. Raz carefully notes that the law does not intend to preclude action
based on other possible reasons, but only a range intended to be excluded. In fact, the law
often allows non-compliance for certain powerful reasons. Crucially, however, even per-
missible reasons must be recognized by the law itself. See KELSEN, supra note 7, at 15-16;
RAZ, supra note 11, at 215.
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The law is distinguished from other normative systems partly
by its claim to authority.71 Different normative systems claim
various levels of authority. Some claim no authority at all. I may
propose a set of rules that people ought to follow, but I do not
take myself to preclude people's other reasons for acting. Some
normative systems claim high levels of authority, but claim them
over a limited range.72 Implicit in a mother's admonishment, "As
long as you live under this roof. . ." is the spatial and temporal
limitation of this level of authority.
Other normative systems, like the law, do not have this limit-
ing feature; these may be labeled global normative systems. The
law claims to regulate the full range of one's activities.7 3 In this
sense, the law is distinct from household and sporting norms;
there is no restricted area."4 Just as important, the law and other
global normative systems, such as religion and morality, claim
the ability to dominate all other normative systems. 75 While they
refrain from interfering with many deeply important fields, the
law and other global normative systems claim the ability to regu-
late all fields and reasons. The law may fully recognize and allow
other normative systems, giving effect to the rules of churches,
private clubs, and the like, but it always reserves the right to cor-
rect or nullify these rules. 76 This claim is of great importance.
The law may define itself as bounded or restricted but, just as
importantly, it may not. The key is that the law represents a type
of normative system that can claim authority over all domains of
reasons; 77 whether or not it chooses to do so is unimportant, and
need not trouble us greatly. 78
71. See RAZ, supra note 8, at 29-30.
72. See RAZ, supra note 70, at 119. The International Olympic Committee, for exam-
ple, claims absolute right to determine the rules of the Olympic games but would not claim
authority over a state's criminal law. The breadth of its authority is limited to the Olympic
Games. Id.
73. See id. at 116-17; KELSEN, supra note 7, at 15-16.
74. See KELSEN, supra note 7, at 15-16; Oberdiek, supra note 4, at 91.
75. See JOSEPH RAZ, Legal Positivism and the Sources of Law, in THE AUTHORITY OF
LAW, supra note 8, at 37, 43.
76. RAZ, supra note 70, at 118-19; see FINNIS, supra note 69, at 276-77; JEROME
HALL, FOUNDATIONS OF JURISPRUDENCE 138-39 (1973); HART, supra note 5, at 106-07;
ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 14-15 (1974).
77. See KELSEN, supra note 7, at 15-16.
78. Id. at 14-15; HART, supra note 5, at 106-07.
2008] 1213
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
This picture of the law seeks simplicity. Law is defined as nor-
mative and as claiming authority over one's practical reasoning.
Law does not provide reasons to be balanced against all other
reasons in practical reasoning. The directive is authoritative inso-
far as it claims to exclude further determination and balancing of
most other reasons for action. The law is, further, a global norma-
tive system and claims the right to issue norms in all domains of
its subjects' lives.
V. THE LAW AND COERCION
The classical model missed the normative aspects of the law
that exist apart from the mere imposition of coercion and, to a
lesser extent, the authoritative status law claims. The classical
model did, however, isolate a third critical feature of legal norms.
The law is distinct as a coercive system of norms. It claims the
right to not only explicate norms but to create and enforce coer-
cive norms.
This article does not propose that the law is coercive as a prac-
tical matter, i.e., a condition of human nature necessary to assure
obedience. 9 Rather, it makes the stronger claim that coercion is
inherent to the very nature of the law. Without understanding
coercion, one misses a defining characteristic of the law. Thus,
one cannot delineate the social phenomenon known as the law
without accounting for its coerciveness. Like Austin and Ben-
tham, who missed the normative and authoritative aspects of
law, some modern theorists have missed an equally important
tenant of the law by denying that it is inherently coercive.
In examining the role of coercion in the law, one must exercise
care not to conflate the coerciveness of the law with the related
fact that it is backed by sanctions. While the law is typically
backed by sanctions, this is neither enough to establish that a
norm is coercive nor sufficient to make the law unique. This dis-
tinction becomes clearer when one inspects the concept of a sanc-
tion more closely.
79. See HART, supra note 5, at 199-200; Lamond, supra note 3, at 45-47. Contra Ober-
diek, supra note 4, at 71.
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A. Sanctions
Sanctions are penalties attached to the breach of a norm, that
typically are meant to discourage breaches of that norm.8 0 Sanc-
tions are much broader phenomena than laws and accompany
violations in many normative systems. The norms of a game, re-
ligion and social custom may all contain some form of sanction.
Sanctions play the same conceptual role in all these systems.
Though sanctions are not unique to the law, their place in the
legal system is a matter of particular difficulty. With most nor-
mative orders, the existence of a norm does not depend on having
a sanction attached to its violation. One may break a moral norm
even if he is not punished. Yet the notion of laws without at-
tached sanctions seems strange. Kelsen, for example, conceived of
the law as simply proscribed norms, the violation of which gives
rise to a corresponding sanction.8 ' This undoubtedly results from
our intuitive focus on criminal laws and their attendant sanctions
as paradigmatic examples of the law. 2
Nevertheless, large portions of the law exist without sanctions.
Much of the law is not concerned with prohibiting actions. The
law of contracts and wills are examples of how the law allows peo-
ple to arrange their lives rather than prohibits specific action. 3
These permissive norms are not directly supported by sanctions,
though failing to fulfill adopted obligations may result in sanc-
tions.8 4 Further, legal duties levied on legal officials, such as
judges, often have no corresponding sanctions.8 " Attaching sanc-
tions to duties imposed on the very people designated to enforce
those duties would be, Raz suggests, impractical.8 6 Officials in-
80. Oberdiek, supra note 4, at 75. I disagree with Oberdiek, who proposes that all
sanctions must be aimed at deterring breach. A sanction tends to exert some rational
pressure in deterring breach but need not be aimed at such deterrence. For example, a fine
for boarding public transportation without pay may be calibrated to the percentage of pre-
dicted law breakers detected to compensate the system for lost revenue, not to deter
breach. See Grant Lamond, The Coerciveness of Law, 20 O.J.L.S. 39, 58-59 (2000).
81. KELSEN, supra note 7, at 108-14.
82. John Finnis, while noting that legal systems provide a wide range of coercively
enforced norms, evidences how punitive sanctions seem naturally to draw our eye. FINNIS,
supra note 69, at 261.
83. See Raz, supra note 41, at 834-35.
84. See id. at 835.
85. See RAZ, supra note 11, at 153.
86. Id.
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stead subject themselves to legal duties because they have a
sense of normative commitment to those duties.8 7
Many sanctions fall short of any plausible definition of coer-
cion. Coercion occurs when sufficient pressure is applied to com-
pel a certain course of action. Many sanctions attached to legal
norms are so weak, and so rarely enforced, that they cannot pro-
vide the reason for compliance.
While sanctions play a major role in coercion, not all sanctions
are coercive. Many sanctions may simply raise the cost of an ac-
tion without precluding it."8 That littering decreases when the
law prohibits it probably results from the normative force at-
tached to the law, quite apart from any attached sanctions. Thus,
it is not hard to imagine passing an anti-littering law without at-
taching sanctions.8 9
Conversely, some legal coercion is imposed without being
linked to sanctions at all. Where a medical quarantine is imposed
against a group, the coercive force applied would be ill-conceived
as a sanction.90
87. Id. Some have countered these propositions by pointing out that the law can be
thought of as attaching a disadvantage to the breach of permissive and official-directed
norms. See Oberdiek, supra note 4, at 75. For example, the disadvantage of breaching the
legal norms required to make a valid will is the invalidity of the will. HART, supra note 5,
at 33. Likewise, an official that does not follow prescribed methods of passing laws or de-
creeing judgments is "punished" by having his purported laws or decrees invalidated. In
cases where norms do not validate a legal right, making the law truly sanctionless, Kelsen
denies the statute is a law at all. KELSEN, supra note 7, at 114-15.
Raz also recognizes that legal norms directed at officials may exist without sanctions,
but he proposes that duty-imposing norms not directed at officials must be backed by sanc-
tions. RAZ, supra note 11, at 152-53. But as Raz's position evolves, he later highlights the
importance of permissive legal norms aimed at the public. These are valid legal norms and
illustrate that the law need not be supported by sanctions. See id. at 155.
The explored sanction of nullity also provides no satisfying reformulation. Although the
invalidation of a legal document is certainly a disadvantage, it is somewhat inconvenient
to equate it to a penalty. See HART, supra note 5. The invalidation of a will, for example, is
a function of a failure of formation. See Oberdiek, supra note 4, at 79. Kelsen believes that
invalidation cannot be considered a penalty, but rather a failure to enter into the norma-
tive regime at all. KELSEN, supra note 7, at 267-68. This invalidity leaves no normative
jurisdiction for attaching a sanction. Conceptually, validity must precede the attached
sanction; without entering into the normative regime, there can be no sanction. See id.
Therefore, permissive norms remain valid legal norms without sanctions.
88. Lamond, supra note 80, at 57.
89. See id. at 53.
90. Notice that when the quarantine is not in response to the breach of a norm, it is
not a sanction. See KELSEN, supra note 40, at 278-79; RAZ, supra note 11, at 79-80; Ober-
diek, supra note 4, at 87-88.
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Some may find this distinction that a sanction is not coercive
until it is "big enough" unsatisfying.91 Yet this distinction is im-
portant for two reasons. First, it reveals that while sanctions and
coercion are related, neither is a subset of the other. Some sanc-
tions are not coercive and some forms of coercion that are not
sanctions. Second, because coercive sanctions interact with our
voluntary choices in certain ways, particularly by overbearing our
will, they engage our moral sensibilities in different ways than
non-coercive sanctions. It is one thing to claim that one was un-
fairly punished, but quite another to claim that the punishment,
or threat of punishment, forced one to follow a particular course
of action. Coercion exacts a different moral toll.92
This analysis reveals that sanctions and coercion are separable
concepts. Sanctions are neither unique to law nor equivalent to
coercion. While sanctions may not be intrinsic to the law, coercion
is; the law is intrinsically coercive.93
B. Coercion
At first blush, my claim should strike many as uncontroversial.
Coercion looms large in the everyday understanding of the law.
Pointing out that the law is coercive may risk making the most
banal of observations. But greater scrutiny of the idea that the
law is defined by coerciveness has divorced the two concepts.
To understand whether the law is inherently coercive, we must
first examine the concept of coercion. Coercion is elusive both be-
cause the concept itself is controversial and it often plays differ-
ent roles in our normative thinking. Indeed, most scholars who
employ the concept of coercion rarely define it with precision.
Even scholars who propose explicit definitions of coercion typi-
cally concede that coercion is a highly contextual concept, which
turns the moral work to which the concept is put.94
91. I am grateful to Michael Moore for pressing me on this point.
92. The nature of coercion inherently calls for moral justification in a way that is
unique from solely being punished.
93. To be precise, sanctions will be inherent in the law to the extent it is needed to
render law coercive.
94. See WERTHEIMER, supra note 37, at 3, 6-7; Mitchell N. Berman, The Normative
Functions of Coercion Claims, 8 LEGAL THEORY 45, 45-46 (2002).
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Still, this article attempts to construct a defensible and persua-
sive view of coercion and illustrate the implications for certain
concepts embedded in coercion. Ultimately, this article attempts
to navigate these nested concepts and defend this view against
competing conceptions.
Coercion is normally claimed when one has been forced by an-
other to act, or refrain from acting, against their will. Coercive
pressure can overcome one's will and make a particular course of
action unreasonably costly. For example, where coercive pressure
is applied to Bob, that pressure would render one or more of his
options unreasonably costly. 95 Coercive pressure in this respect
makes a particular option unreasonable but not necessarily im-
possible.96 A small number may always be able to resist such
pressure. In other words, coercion need not be a "success" term.9"
Coercive pressure, however, is neither radically subjective nor
a purely psychological phenomenon. A particularly skittish per-
son may find even the most trivial threat genuinely overwhelm-
ing. Perhaps, from that person's point of view, there is a sincere
claim of coercion. But a perfectly subjective claim cannot deter-
95. Mitchell Berman explores how these two different aspects of coercion forward dif-
ferent normative claims and can be viewed as analytically distinct. See Berman, supra
note 94, at 46-47. The first aspect of coercion consists of the claim that one's actions are
excused because his will was overcome such that he could not act voluntarily (coercion,).
Id. at 59. The second aspect focuses on the act of wrongfully imposing pressure-
threatening to violate one's moral duty owed to another by inducing him to act in a way he
otherwise may not (coercion,). Id. at 53.
Though Berman argues that these two aspects serve different purposes, it is important
to view both when examining the role of coercion in the law. CoercionE plays a large role in
legal coercion. To answer the question of whether or not law is inherently coercive we
must look at one facet of coercionE. That is, we must look at whether the law can force its
subjects to claim that their actions are no longer voluntary. Ultimately, the law must be
felt by its subjects as coercive.
This article does not view coercion as an excuse in the strictest sense of the word. Where
the law compels morally sound behavior, it would be peculiar to invoke a claim of excuse.
Still, we are interested in the same normative feature that makes excuses viable; the
claim that one's voluntary actions were in some ways overcome or severely constrained.
This normative feature is occasionally invoked for reasons other than to excuse behavior.
For example, one may withhold praise if he or she discovers that the actor is engaged in
praiseworthy behavior because he or she had little choice. Id. at 87-88. Certainly, one
would be unlikely to praise someone when he only followed a law, merely because it is law-
ful. We are interested in this type of phenomenon-obeying the law because of its coercion,
or at least the perception that one has little choice but to obey the law due to its coercion.
96. See id. at 84. In other words, the law does not simply claim to coercively prohibit
or mandate action, but continually applies pressure to enforce its sanctions.
97. William A. Edmundson, Is Law Coercive?, 1 LEGAL THEORY 81, 84-85 & n.10
(1995).
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mine whether the pressure that overcame that person's will made
his alternatives unreasonable.
Further, abandoning a purely psychological view of coercion
prevents one from viewing coercion as susceptible to a purely em-
pirical analysis. It would, of course, be attractively straightfor-
ward to discover that moral conclusions not only supervened on
natural facts, but could also be fully derived from them. But there
is no reason to believe that one can reach such conclusions with-
out introducing some moral judgments. 9' The most important im-
plication is that the level of pressure needed to make a choice un-
reasonable will turn on the relationship between the act being
compelled and the harm being threatened. Thus, whether the
pressure was coercive will always involve a deep moral judg-
ment. 99
This view of coercion-pressure that no one could reasonably
resist-has much in common with Aristotle's view of coercion. 100
Under Aristotle's view, one is coerced when forced to act on ex-
ternally applied pressure. 10' Aristotle is purposefully ambiguous
about how one might neatly define external pressure. Nonethe-
less, he clearly points out that describing one as coerced by any
internal motivation would turn all volitional acts into coerced
acts."°2 Thus, for Aristotle, a classic case of coercion and pardon-
able behavior is where the motivating force stems from externally
applied pressure. 103
To an important extent, Aristotle's model of coercion is a moral-
ized one.' 4 Whether one is compelled to adopt an action depends
on whether the pressure was external and could not have been
reasonably resisted.'o5 As Aristotle notes, "On some actions praise
indeed is not bestowed, but pardon is, when one does what he
98. See WERTHEIMER, supra note 37, at 7-8. Hume most famously introduced the "is"!
"ought" distinction.
99. See ARISTOTLE, Ethica Nicomachean, in THE BASIC WORKS OF ARISTOTLE 935,
964-66 Richard McKeon ed., W.D. Ross trans., (1941)); see also Lamond, supra note 80, at
44, 52; Oberdiek, supra note 4, at 80.
100. See ARISTOTLE, supra note 99, at 964-65.
101. See id. Particularly, where one has an internally motivated fear or desire prem-
ised on an externally generated force, say a fear of drowning generated by a storm at sea,
these may be "mixed" actions. Id.
102. See id. at 965.
103. Id. at 965-66.
104. See id. at 965.
105. Id.
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ought not under pressure which overstrains human nature and
which no one could withstand." °6 Nevertheless, it is not a wholly
moralized view; Aristotle does not explicitly equate coercion with
the presence of an independent rights violation.'07
Given the central role it plays, it is important to clarify the con-
ception of coercion being forwarded. Coercion is pressure that
overcomes another's will-overstrains human nature-by apply-
ing pressure one cannot reasonably resist.' That pressure is co-
ercive even if some exceptional persons can heroically resist it. To
be coerced, the pressure must aim to force one to act against his
will-act as they otherwise would not. If the pressure is focused
on actions the actor would willingly adopt, he is not coerced; the
coercive pressure remains, but is dormant.' 9 This conception re-
mains moralized to the extent that there is no clear definition of
what choices are unreasonable-this will turn in large part on a
moral weighing of the interests involved.
One debate surrounding coercion centers on one aspect of legal
coercion, the pressure notion of coercion. Mitchell Berman illus-
trates this debate by identifying a measure of coercive pressure
as coercionw. "' He defines coercion w as a normative function; co-
ercion describes pressure that violates an independent moral
duty."' The pressure described in coercionw, wrongful pressure, is
coercion precisely because it threatens to violate a moral duty."2
William Edmundson and Arthur Ripstein also argue that pres-
sure is not coercive unless applied in some immoral way." 3
106. Id. This is not a purely psychological measure in Aristotle's view, even if one were
placed under tremendous pressure. There are some acts which one cannot be considered
compelled to do. Rather, some acts are such that one ought suffer death, or worse, rather
than be pushed to commit them. Id.
107. Here, there is some ambiguity in Aristotle's conception--"one does what he ought
not." Id. It does not seem Aristotle goes so far as to link coercion to a rights violation.
108. Id.
109. See infra text accompanying notes 124-40.
110. Berman, supra note 94, at 50-51.
111. Id. at 52-53.
112. Berman does not commit to the idea that this is the only form of normative claim
embedded in coercion. Hence, coercionE describes coercion as excusing. See id. at 88.
113. Edmundson, supra note 97, at 85-86; Arthur Ripstein, Authority and Coercion, 32
PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 15, 17, 21-22 (2004). Edmundson and Ripstein seem to underpin Ober-
diek's view. Oberdiek has led the modern attack on the concept of law as coercive by view-
ing the law as most significantly liberating instead of repressive. Oberdiek, supra note 4,
at 92.
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Not all pressure exerted by the law is wrongful. But, it is a
matter of grave concern anytime the law imposes wrongful coer-
cive pressure. It is just this fear that compels us to inquire into
the coerciveness of the law. Because legal pressure is intention-
ally imposed by a legal norm, however, whether any particular
instance of legal pressure is wrongful depends on a thoroughly
moralized theory-in the case of the law, a theory of political mo-
rality-of why that pressure, violates some moral duty.114 Where
the law exerts pressure on a person without violating moral duty,
can it be properly considered coercive? Is non-wrongful pressure
coercive?
Ripstein, in exploring a related thesis, proposes that coercion
only occurs between private citizens when one improperly uses
the other as a means to his own ends, thus violating the moral
duties owed to him.1 5 Ripstein's account explores how, outside
the context of private citizens, coercion can be understood as
forcefully guiding another's actions through external pressure
when internal normative guidance fails. 6 But, where pressure
does not interfere with the pursuit of legitimate aims, it is not
fully coercive. 117 Similarly, Edmundson argues that coercion only
occurs when a unilateral coercive threat is immoral.11 For exam-
ple, where the law prohibits a potential wrongdoer from unjusti-
fiably killing, the law is not properly considered coercive because
it cannot be seriously argued that such prohibitions are im-
moral.119 For these scholars, that law supplies sufficient pressure
to foreclose certain courses of action is insufficient to render it
fully coercive.
Edmundson argues that concluding that the law is coercive
solely because of the amount of pressure it applies, ignoring
whether that pressure is immoral, is both over and under-
inclusive. 2 ° A pressure theory of coercion is over-inclusive be-
cause it will "count as coercive significantly many more cases"
than alternative moralized theories of coercion.12' Without more,
114. See Berman, supra note 94, at 45.
115. See Ripstein, supra note 113, at 22.
116. See id. at 23.
117. Id.
118. Edmundson, supra note 97, at 85.
119. See id. at 85-86.
120. See id. at 94.
121. Id.
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specifically a compelling explanation regarding why those cases
are mistaken, Edmundson's critique provides little reason to re-
ject a pressure account of coercion due to over-inclusion.
Edmundson further argues that a pressure theory would be
unsustainably under-inclusive because of to the individualized ef-
fects of coercion. 112 The law would not exert pressure on those
who are disinclined to commit a crime for independent moral rea-
sons or those who believe they can escape detection. This would
not count as coercion, and a pressure theory would, therefore, be
under-inclusive.123 John Gardner similarly proposes that the law
cannot be considered inherently coercive where its coercive effects
are dormant. 124
This is a peculiar critique of the general coerciveness of the
law. That one may act for independent reasons does not under-
mine the law's coerciveness; the law can still eliminate choice in
acting if those independent reasons fail. If a prisoner does not
want to try his luck in the forest surrounding a prison during a
blizzard, do his independent reasons for not leaving suddenly
render the fact that he is legally prohibited from leaving the
prison in any case noncoercive? Dormant coercive force remains
coercive.
Berman and Ripstein's similar restrictive definition of coer-
cion-wrongful or immorally imposed pressure-also fails to con-
vince. In fact, Berman's own work contains an adequate response
to this collective objection.' 25 As Berman notes, when natural
forces equally restrain a person's courses of action, there is little
way to distinguish why he is any less compelled than when influ-
enced by human forces. 126 Thus, cliffs on either side of a driver
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. John Gardner, Prohibiting Immoralities, 28 CARDOzO L. REV. 2613, 2624 (2007)
("[Law is coercive] only in those cases in which the threat is operative, i.e., in which it fig-
ures in the reasoning of those against whom it is issued.").
125. See Berman, supra note 94, at 63.
126. See id. Berman illustrates the dual nature of coercion, with coercionE representing
the excusing nature, where the cost of one's choices are heavy enough to restrict his ac-
tions. Berman ultimately concludes that there is no difference in the nature of the excuse
of one's actions when the pressure is man-made rather than natural. But, comparing one
who is forced to run over pedestrians because a gunman threatens to kill him with one
who is forced by a storm to refrain from swerving, the difference may be that people expect
to bear the cost of natural tragedies that threaten them, but not the cost of another's ille-
gitimate imposition on their will. That argument is outside the scope of this article.
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can decisively restrict a person's choice to veer away from a pe-
destrian lying across the road. 127 To the extent that natural pres-
sure sufficiently forecloses a person's options or serve as an ex-
cuse, his act is equally involuntary. 128
Of course, many involuntary acts are not properly described as
coercive. 129 Perhaps the term coerced is inappropriate in Ber-
man's example because a human agent with the intent to coerce
the driver is lacking. But law, the product of purposeful human
action, does not suffer from this problem. If amoral forces can
render a person's choices involuntary, there seems little reason
why we cannot similarly describe human forces. 130 Again, it is
important to distinguish between involuntary choices naturally
imposed and coerced choices intentionally imposed. That distinc-
tion does not apply, however, to intentionally imposed human ac-
tion, even if the imposition does not violate a person's rights.
Berman, Edmundson and Ripstein give us good reasons to see
why pressure must be wrongful before coercion invokes a moral
claim of excuse. 131 They do not, however, explain why rightful
pressure cannot be used to describe coercion-pressure that
eliminates other reasonable courses of action. 13 2 If this pressure
theory of coercion is viable, then the law's ability to restrain a
person's options is coercive regardless of the final moral judgment
of its appropriateness. 3 3 Thus, regardless of whether the pres-
127. See id.
128. See id. Harry Frankfurt properly focuses on the fact that one's will may still be
overborne in that situation. HARRY G. FRANKFURT, Coercion and Moral Responsibility, in
THE IMPORTANCE OF WHAT WE CARE ABOUT: PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAYS, 26,45-46 (1988).
129. See WERTHEIMER, supra note 37, at 4.
130. See Peter Westen, "Freedom" and "Coercion"-Virtue Words and Vice Words, 1985
DUKE L.J. 541, 560 (1985). Of course one may simply deny that the choice to run over the
pedestrian is involuntary. Such a view would lead to the conclusion that human actions
which do not violate a person's independent rights are coercive. See NOZICK, supra note 76,
at 262.
131. Similarly, Wertheimer illustrates how when a person has "been forced" to do X,
the sense in which he is forced may depend on the type of normative claim embedded in
the coercion claim. See WERTHEIMER, supra note 37, at 252-56. Indeed this is the point of
Berman's distinction between coercion, and coercion.
132. There are many different ways in which we employ coercion claims. Wertheimer
points out that coercion may turn on the task to which it is employed. This article's defini-
tions of coercion may be deeply contextual, but only some of which focus on the notion of
state employed coercion. See id. at 184-88.
133. Regardless of whether Berman's distinction of coercion or Ripstein's analysis
would label such pressure as fully coercive, rational pressure still stands in need of justifi-
cation. See Edmundson, supra note 97, at 88; Lamond, supra note 80, at 49-51.
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sure applied is wrongful, pressure that restricts one's ability to
reasonably choose an option is coercive.
In contrast to the sense of coercion used above, when a person
is coerced, he is not only brought under coercive pressure to do a,
but his will is in fact overcome, leading him to do a.114 The focus
is not on increasing the costs of the option, but on the very idea
that his will was overborne, causing him to act a certain way. 135
These differences may not reflect any deep semantic differences
in the concept of coercion; the underlying phenomenon remains
the same in both cases. But stressing these different uses allows
one to isolate certain debates surrounding coercion and, perhaps,
makes some progress in clarifying them.
Focusing on overcoming a person's will highlights a particular
debate embedded in coercion, specifically, two different modes of
coercion. One manner of overbearing another's will is bringing ra-
tional pressure-"rational coercion"-to bear. 136 Rational coercion
relies on increasing the cost of a certain course of action until it is
unreasonably high. A person's desire to engage in that course of
action is eventually overcome; he can no longer rationally choose
that course of action. When legal, social and other sanctions raise
the cost of certain actions past what a person can reasonably
bear, the sanctions are to that extent coercive. Many things that
seem like physical coercion are, in the first instance, rational co-
ercion; a robber pointing a gun at a person does not, strictly
speaking, pry the money out of his hands, but rather radically
changes the costs of his choices.
A second way of overbearing a person's will is physical coer-
cion. Physical coercion occurs when a person's will is overcome by
acting upon him as a physical being.'37 A person's refusal to move
may be overcome when he is hoisted bodily and removed. Like-
wise, having his closed hand forced open by physical pressure
134. Cf. Lamond, supra note 80, at 51. In many ways this distinction is no different
than the trying/accomplishing distinction inherent in many words. For example, the word
"bribed" may refer to merely giving a person money in an attempt to improperly influence
him, or it may describe the money having successfully influenced the person. With coer-
cion, however, this common distinction leads to conceptual confusion. See Oberdiek, supra
note 4, at 80.
135. Lamond, supra note 3, at 40.
136. Id.
137. See generally id. (noting that directly using irresistible physical force to make a
person do something amounts to coercion).
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represents central case of physical coercion. 138 Frankfurt notes
that some cases of physical coercion are difficult to separate from
rational coercion. Where a person is being tortured and reveals
secret information, it can be difficult to know if the information
slips from sheer exhaustion or from the prospect of further tor-
ture. 
139
Hans Oberdiek, Berman and others are understandably suspi-
cious of considering physical force as properly coercive. 4 0 It is dif-
ficult to isolate a coherent view of physical coercion. Oberdiek's
objection turns on his notion that coerced behavior must be the
result of voluntary action; notwithstanding that the behavior, by
default, is compelled, it must be voluntary.' Oberdiek defines
coercion as a reasonably believable threat of visited evil if one
chooses a given option.'42 Oberdiek limits coercion to the threat
and not the harm itself. 143 A person is coerced, in this sense, when
enough rational force is applied to make him do another's will.
Oberdiek is correct to the extent he emphasizes that coercion
need not be a success concept. A person can be under coercive
pressure even when he is not coerced into performing a particular
action; applying unreasonable pressure is coercive even if it is re-
sistible.'44 Because, however, he ignores that coercion can de-
scribe the pressure applied as well as the success in physically
overbearing a person's will, Oberdiek misses varying modes of co-
ercion. In particular, he denies that central cases of physical coer-
cion qualify as coercion at all.'45 As a result, he misses important
elements of the law's coerciveness.
Oberdiek's resistance relates to the objection that physical co-
ercion constitutes one being acted upon as a physical being, hav-
138. See FRANKFURT, supra note 128, at 26. But see Oberdiek, supra note 4, at 82.
139. FRANKFURT, supra note 128, at 26-27. Many things that look like physical coer-
cion are, in fact, rational coercion. Imprisonment, torture, and physical threats usually
rely on their threat for coercive effect; only when this threat fails do they implement
physical coercion.
140. See Berman, supra note 94, at 50-51; Oberdiek, supra note 4, at 82.
141. See Oberdiek, supra note 4, at 81. This partly turns on Oberdiek's position that
coercion is limited to the fear of threatened evil and not evil itself. See id. at 80.
142. See id. at 83.
143. See id. at 82.
144. See Lamond, supra note 80, at 44.
145. See Oberdiek, supra note 4, at 82; see also Lamond, supra note 80, at 40.
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ing no interaction with rationality or will. Physical coercion
seems to describe actions that are unwilled.
Although Oberdiek rejects the idea of physical coercion, his
conception of coercion shares the idea that one's will must be
overborne.' 46 The point of coercion is to apply sufficient pressure
so a person cannot reasonably veer from the coerced course of ac-
tion. If this is the crux of the shared concept of coercion, there is
an internal tension in insisting that such behavior be chosen vol-
untarily while, at the same time, recognizing that the choice is
involuntary. Thus, there is no reason to exclude from this defini-
tion instances of physical coercion when they focus on the same
phenomenon-overcoming a person's will.
Where force is used as an end unto itself, a distinction emerges.
Force as an end does not attempt to interact with a person's will.
When a person strikes another in anger, that use of force is aimed
as an end unto itself.147 It is not meant to compel or interact with
the other's will. This may make characterizing physical compul-
sion as coercion where one seems to be simply acted upon seem
strange. The bulk of legal force, however, is not used as an end,
but is particularly concerned with compelling a person to take, or
restrain from taking, action. In the legal context, force typically
plays a coercive role.' 4
There are three typical examples of the legal application of
force. The first, and most obvious, is forcing compliance or prohib-
iting breach of legal norms, such as when the police prevent a
crime. The second is threatening sanctions, such as imprison-
ment, to induce rational coercion. The third is enforcing legal or-
ders or sanctions, for example, when a marshal enforces a judg-
ment. All of these are focal cases of legal coercion; none represent
force used as an end unto itself. Of course, there are cases where
a legal directive may order force employed as an end-a CIA or-
der to have someone assassinated. But, it is perhaps best not to
consider this coercion at all. 4 9
146. See Oberdiek, supra note 4, at 82 (stating that force must be resistible to be coer-
cive).
147. That is not to say that his force may not be linked to some other ultimate end.
Rather, the use of force does not seek to compel anything further.
148. Cf. RAZ, supra note 9, at 157 (noting that force is used as an enforcement message
to ensure compliance with the law).
149. Using physical force in the law is still linked to legal coercion. Ultimately, the jus-
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Admittedly the distinction between coercive force and non-
coercive force is difficult to determine. When is force used to over-
come a person's will as opposed to being an end unto itself? If a
thief reaches into someone's pocket and steals his wallet, there is
no question of coercion; this is simply theft. If an assailant strikes
a person, again there does not seem to be coercion. If a thief grabs
a person's hand and forces him to remove a wallet from another's
pocket, how is this properly described? In what sense, if any, does
this constitute overcoming the will so that this force could be con-
sidered coercive as opposed to simple theft?
Overcoming another's will is crucial to distinguishing between
coercive and non-coercive force. The two modes of coercion deline-
ated above, track particular forms of overcoming a person's will.
The key to understanding the two modes of coercion, rational and
physical, is that they typically restrict a person's opportunity sets
to render certain choices unreasonable or work to incapacitate a
person's will. When the robber proclaims, "Your money or your
life," the effect raises the cost of keeping your wallet well past the
breaking point of reasonable deliberation. Thus, the robber has
limited the opportunity sets dramatically-the choice to carry
about your business or give to others is unbearably curtailed.
Alternatively, physical coercion often works by flatly incapaci-
tating a person's will. When the police bar a person from leaving
a room by physically blocking him, the cost has not only been
raised, but the execution of his will has been purposefully
blocked. This contrasts scenarios where force is used as an end
unto itself, which have no relationship with a person's will. This
distinction leaves some difficult examples unresolved. If the thief
forces your hand into your pocket to steal your wallet, has he in-
capacitated your will? This represents a borderline and admit-
tedly unclear example of coercion.
This explication, particularly the notion of restricting a per-
son's opportunity sets, invites a further question relating to ways
the law may be coercive. Can offers be coercive? Consider the
mother who cannot afford the exorbitant cost of medication to
prevent her child from dying. She is approached by a millionaire
who offers to pay for the medication if she will sleep with him.15 o
tification for using force is to compel obedience and stop the violation of valid legal norms.
Such a justification, as with the justification of all coercive force, requires careful scrutiny.
150. See Joel Feinberg, Noncoercive Exploitation, in PATERNALISM 201, 208 (Rolf Sarto-
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Arguably, there would be no coercion because the offer does not
threaten to remove from her something to which she had access.
The offer actually expands her opportunity sets; where her child
faced certain death before, she now has an opportunity, however
repugnant, to save her child. Perhaps there are other reasons we
morally condemn this offer besides it being coercive. Analogously,
the law often attempts to induce certain actions-marriage and
homeownership, for example-by offering a host of benefits. Do
those incentives constitute legal coercion?'51
The argument that the expansion of one's opportunity sets can-
not be properly construed as coercive owes a great deal to Robert
Nozick's taxonomy in his important piece on coercion. 15 2 But, it is
not obvious why coercion should be limited to threats to deprive
as opposed to offers that cannot be reasonably declined. Accepting
this limitation depends on accepting that coercion only results
from reducing a person's opportunities, not merely from severely
restricting opportunity sets. If a person's opportunity sets are re-
stricted by certain offers to the extent that he could not reasona-
bly choose to act otherwise, his will is equally overcome. 5 3 There
is no reason to believe that only threats meet Nozick's critical dis-
tinction-imposing or expressing the will of another.' Many of-
fers can be intentionally made to render a course of action sub-
stantially less available thus controlling a person's will through
the actions of another. 155
Conceiving coercion as including threats and offers leads to
strange results. Offering a starving man a job could be character-
rius ed., 1983).
151. I am grateful to Heidi Hurd for pressing me on this issue.
152. Robert Nozick, Coercion, in PHILOSOPHY, POLITICS AND SOCIETY 101 (Peter Laslett
et al. eds., 4th series 1972).
153. Id. at 128-29.
154. Id. As Nozick points out, not all offers, even when one cannot refuse, will be prop-
erly considered coercive. In some cases, events otherwise not properly considered coercive
may force a person to choose a course or render him unfree to do otherwise. Id. at 101.
155. Nozick notes that focusing on overcoming a person's will makes it difficult to dis-
tinguish between coercive threats and overwhelming offers. See id. at 132. He then pro-
poses that the key to understanding why threats are coercive, as opposed to offers, is that
a rational person will willingly receive an offer, for they can always decline, but would not
willingly choose to face a threat. Id. at 133. It is not clear, however, why this distinction
removes the offer from Nozick's earlier arguments. If the crux of coercion is overcoming a
person's will by either substantially reducing his opportunity sets or incapacitating his
will, then an offer may still be coercive. Indeed, Nozick's own argument is that an action
taken to make an alternative less (or more) likely may overcome a person's will. See id. at
104. Thus, it is hard to see why offers ought to be excluded.
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ized as coercive in certain circumstances. Taken to the extreme,
perhaps capitalism could be considered coercive.156 Could a law-
yer, offered a job at ten times his current salary at a more pres-
tigious firm, have been coerced into switching jobs?1"7
We need not go so far to rescue a usable conception of coercion.
While it may be uncomfortable to describe a job offer to a starving
man as coercive, it is natural to imagine the man saying that he
had no choice but to take the job. If one imagines an economic
system in which the only jobs available are grueling, physically
destructive jobs at subsistence wages, and people are perfectly
free to turn them down and starve to death, literally an offer they
cannot refuse, these offers would be plausibly coercive. Similarly,
if the legal benefits in a society allowed a person to secure a job, a
home and a large dowry upon marriage, and without marriage he
faced a lifetime of uncertainty and near poverty, the legal system
may be coercing citizens to marry.5 ' These circumstances may
come about in other ways without the intent of any will to restrict
others to a course of action. In other words, people could simply
be forced by circumstances to act in certain ways or feel unfree to
act in their desired ways. While unfree or nonvoluntary choices
that a person may face may not be labeled coercive, where the cir-
cumstances of the offers were created with the intent to restrict
available courses of action, there may be a coercive offer.5 9
This line is difficult to draw. In cases where a person is offered
an overwhelming benefit-the lawyer offered a ten-fold raise, for
example-one is rightfully hesitant to characterize this as coer-
cion. While it may border on unthinkable for the lawyer to turn
down the job, the lawyer could, in fact, reasonably turn it down. 6 0
But perhaps this is wrong. Whether something is coercive will
always turn on judgments about whether a person could behave
156. WERTHEIMER, supra note 37, at 4-5.
157. See FRANKFURT, supra note 128, at 41-42.
158. Frankfurt highlights the importance of such background considerations when
judging coercion based on an offer/threat distinction. See id. at 32-33.
159. See David Zimmerman, Coercive Wage Offers, 10 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 121, 144-45
(1981) (explaining when a wage offer counts as coercion). Zimmerman notes important ad-
ditional conditions that may be necessary to describe appropriately the situation as coer-
cive, particularly, whether a person has behaved purposefully to prevent the coercion from
creating conditions with alternative choices. Others have offered insightful arguments
against this controversial point. See Lawrence A. Alexander, Zimmerman on Coercive
Wage Offers, 12 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 160, 161 (1983).
160. Presumably those reasons would turn on non-economic factors.
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reasonably otherwise. This proposition requires further argument
but does suggest that by understanding coercion to be both re-
stricting opportunity sets and incapacitating the will, the idea of
a coercive offer becomes viable.
We have wandered a bit far a field. We now return to the inca-
pacitation of the will and its relationship with the use of force.
Oberdiek rightfully points out that the use of force does not trans-
form every sanction into a coercive sanction:
That legal systems permit and authorize the police to use force to
prevent certain crimes or to apprehend criminal suspects or to take
convicted criminals to prison does not entail that these measures are
coercive sanctions; they are not even sanctions. Police have the right
to prevent anyone from attempting to hijack an airplane, but the
possibility of being shot-a risk run by hijackers and the fear of
which might deter them-is not a legal sanction for attempted hi-
jacking: that sanction is a prison sentence. Only when specified as a
penalty for violating or neglecting a law should we regard the legal
use of force as a coercive sanction.1
61
In one sense, he is correct. But this illustrates, and Oberdiek
does not defeat, that legal sanctions are coercively enforced.
Moreover, this applies to all sanctions, even those that do not im-
pose costs that rise to the level of coercion.' 62 By separating sanc-
tions from coercion and noticing that coercion is a broader concept
than sanctions, we notice that law is coercive even when it does
not impose coercive sanctions. Thus, this article's primary inquiry
into the coerciveness of law does not turn on Oberdiek's distinc-
tion.
Strangely, Oberdiek does not seem to disagree with this pic-
ture. He illustrates that a threatened prison sentence may give a
person no choice but to pay a parking fine. 163 Yet, "[it would be a
mistake [ I to regard the fine as coercive; only the threat of im-
prisonment for contempt of court constitutes a coercive sanc-
tion."'64 But the question is not whether all legal sanctions are
161. Oberdiek, supra note 4, at 88.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 89.
164. Id. The success notion of coercion may seem to swamp the pressure notion. Given
that the law's success in coercing someone requires that he experience the law as coercive,
legal norms can seemingly impose the requisite amount of pressure. These concepts are
unsurprisingly related. Separating these two facets of pressure, however, allows us to un-
derstand coercion when compliance with the intended course of action is unsuccessful. For
example, a court may order a journalist to reveal a source. If the journalist refuses, the
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coercive, but whether the law as a normative system is coer-
cive.' 65 The critical question is whether the law is coercive not
simply whether each legal sanction is coercive or if the law stipu-
lates force as a coercive sanction. Despite the fact that not all
sanctions are coercive, the above paradigmatic instances of legal
force suggest that all sanctions are backed by coercive force.
Thus, Oberdiek's point that many of the sanctions of a mature le-
gal system do not rise to the level of coercion is inapposite.166 Fi-
nally, his point that legal sanctions may be a pragmatic necessity
insufficiently addresses the role of coercion in individuating the
law as a unique normative system. 167
It is clear that people, by and large, experience the law as coer-
cive on two levels. First, the law imposes pressure that often
makes a course of action unreasonably costly. 16 Thus, the law is
coercive by raising the cost of prohibited behavior to prevent it.
Second, the law, unlike other normative systems, claims the right
to coercively enforce its sanctions. On this level, nearly all people
experience the law as coercive. So while it is true that a minor
sanction, infrequently enforced, may not deter the sanctioned be-
havior, it is clear that when that sanction is levied, the state re-
serves the right to compel compliance. In this situation, both as-
pects of coercion are used. Most subjects will feel that they must
involuntarily comply with any imposed legal sanction, knowing
that the cost of noncompliance will continually increase until it
overcomes their resistance. The legal regime itself will continue
to impose pressure until it coercively overbears the subjects' wills.
Those who do not succumb to rational pressure on any level will
have sanctions forcibly imposed upon them.
court may threaten costlier sanctions until finally the journalist is put in jail. While the
journalist does not succumb to the pressure to reveal her source, the law seemingly exerts
coercive pressure. As Berman noted the two sides of normative claims of coercion, we must
see these two sides to understand coercion in the law.
165. Hart distinguished between exploring the law as a legal system and laws as indi-
vidual legal norms. See H.L.A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71
HARV. L. REV. 593, 600-01 (1958); see also MICHAEL S. MOORE, Law as a Functional Kind,
in EDUCATING ONESELF IN PUBLIC: CRITICAL ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE 294, 299 (2000).
166. See Oberdiek, supra note 4, at 89.
167. Id.
168. While the legally imposed cost does not stop some people, those people commit
crimes despite the fact that the cost has often been made unreasonable. This also illus-
trates the distinction between the pressure and success notions of coercion and demon-
strates that coercion need not always be a success concept.
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Oberdiek's core objection to defining the law as coercive is that
it ignores the profound ways in which the law is a moral good;
law has the capacity to be deeply liberating. 169 While Oberdiek is
unquestionably correct, the moral goods the law secures do not
erase its coercive nature. Rather, it justifies law's coercion and
explains its value and near universality in human society. Indeed
Immanuel Kant points out that the use of coercion to restrict un-
just actions may be authorized by the moral principles that ren-
der the restricted action unjust. 170 Kant realizes that the critical
burden of the law is the just use of coercion; the law must con-
tinuously justify its coercive force. 7 ' The obligations imposed by
just law and the moral authorization to coercively impose these
obligations cannot be separated-their unity is required by jus-
tice. 172 Regardless of whether one signs on for Kant's full model, it
points out that even where legal coercion is justified, where it is
liberating, we can still recognize that the law is coercive. The lib-
eration the law secures does not mean that the law should not be
recognized as coercive. Rather, it explains why this terrifically
important coercive institution is often justified. Moreover, recog-
nizing that the law is coercive can draw our attention to this very
point: the law must be vigilantly regarded and justified.
VI. COERCION IN LEGAL NORMATIVITY
The previous sections address objections to the common intui-
tion that the law is coercive. That all sanctions are not coercive
does not mean that the law is not coercive. Indeed, the concepts of
sanctions and coercion are separable. Further, the fact that the
law may threaten to compel behavior without threatening a
rights violation does not mean such compulsion is not coercive.
169. Oberdiek argues that:
Nothing can be necessarily, universally, or by nature coercive which has
within it the capacity to be as profoundly liberating as law. Even in the worst
legal systems of the most oppressive governments, the liberating potential of
law is never wholly suppressed. And in the better systems of tolerable or good
governments, the liberating effects of law are immense. At its best, law not
only protects its subjects from harm, but it augments their natural powers
many times.
Oberdiek, supra note 4, at 92.
170. IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICAL ELEMENTS OF JUSTICE 35-36 (J. Ladd
trans., Bobbs-Merrill Co. 1965) (1797).
171. Id. at 36.
172. See id.
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Coercion focuses on overbearing a person's will. To that extent,
the use of force as an end is a problematic instance of coercion.
Still, no positive case that the law is coercive has been pro-
posed. Why should the law be viewed as coercive? Why must coer-
cion be a conceptual necessity to understand the law? This section
will explore why coercion is best seen as conceptually necessary
for the law.
Without understanding the role of coercion, one cannot under-
stand the singularity of the law as a system of norms. Coercion
individuates the particular normative system, defining the insti-
tution known as law. Here I will employ that old jurisprudential
construct, the Martian sociologist to reinforce the earlier conten-
tion that coercion plays a distinct, conceptual role in the law
apart from the law's efficiency, authority, or importance in soci-
ety. Doing so will also address important critiques of the picture
drawn.
Raz has prosecuted important critiques of the idea that the law
is coercive. His position in considering the inherent coerciveness
of the law has evolved over the years. Raz's earliest incarnations
adopted Oberdiek's view that coercion and the law are separa-
ble.173 Raz's later work abandons this position for a more sophis-
ticated and compelling objection to viewing the law as inherently
coercive.174 While these views recognized that the law and sanc-
tions are separable and that law is a normative system ultimately
backed by force, they did not sufficiently denote the law as inher-
ently coercive.17 Notwithstanding that sometimes Raz explores
the belief that coercion is plausibly an inherent part of the law,176
his prior arguments to the contrary require response.
Raz proposes that the law as a human institution may always
be coercive to assure conformity from its subjects;' 77 but concep-
tually, this need not be so. He proposes that even in a community
of angels who are unfailingly committed to obeying legal norms,
differing conceptions of good, self-interest or mere accidents
would necessitate institutions to authoritatively resolve dis-
173. See, e.g., JOSEPH RAz, THE AUTHORITY OF LAW, supra note 8, at vi.
174. See generally RAZ, supra note 40, at 112.
175. See RAZ, supra note 9, at 156-62.
176. See RAZ, supra note 40, at 210; RAZ, supra note 75, at 44 n.4.
177. See RAZ, supra note 75, at 44-45; see also Lamond, supra note 3, at 46 & n.33.
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putes. 78 In such a community, however, coercion and perhaps
sanctions depending on how one characterized civil remedies,
would be unnecessary. 7 9 Thus, coercion, whatever its role in hu-
man institutions, is not conceptually necessary in the law.
The rebuttal to Raz's critique lies in which of the two compet-
ing pictures constructs a persuasive, or for that matter, identifi-
able picture of law. Where should one begin in isolating the social
system of law? While separating the law from threats or orders,
neither isolating normative systems nor focusing on normative
systems that claim global authority identifies a unique system.
Moral principles and religious doctrine are normative systems
that claim global authority. They also claim to authoritatively de-
termine a person's reasons for acting. For example, confronted
with the Catholic church's adjudicative institutions, authoritative
decrees, and use of sanctions, both worldly and otherwise, can
preclude the Martian sociologist from distinguishing between the
church and the modern legal system. The difference is the Catho-
lic church cannot, at least in modern liberal states, coercively en-
force obedience to its religious norms except by appealing to the
law. The church may occasionally be coercive; it may exert deci-
sive economic or social pressure or coercive pressure on those who
deem church sanctions as particularly powerful reasons for ac-
tion. But these exceptions do not erase the differences between
the two systems.
This illustrates that while coercion is constitutively necessary
in the law, it is not because of the law's effectiveness, importance
or authority. Let our visitor travel to a community of highly reli-
gious and exemplary persons, a community of saints. The state
has promulgated few laws in comparison with modern legal sys-
tems, but it does cover the basics of criminal, tort, contract and
property law. In this land, although the basic laws may be en-
forced, they are complied with unthinkingly. They are considered
rudimentary in each citizen's quest to obtain great moral
achievement. Conflicts that fall outside the rudimentary legal
178. RAZ, supra note 9, at 159-60. Lon Fuller shares this intuition. See LON L. FULLER,
THE MORALITY OF LAW 55-56 (1964). Yet, this view assumes that angels would be unfail-
ingly dedicated to obeying the law. As Finnis notes, it is not only moral failing which re-
quires coercion. FINNIS, supra note 69, at 260-61. "[H]igh minded" and principled opposi-
tion may cause some to disregard legal stipulations. Id. Further, there would be other
moral reasons to introduce the law. See id. at 268-69.
179. See RAZ, supra note 9, at 160.
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system are taken to the ranking religious official for enlightened
settlements. Though these dictates are scrupulously obeyed, they
are not coercively supported like the basic norms.
Notice that unlike Hart, who believed coercion was important
to guarantee that the interests of the innocent would be protected
against those who would violate the law,180 in the community of
saints, the distinctive role coercion plays is not based on efficacy
and does not determine, on most accounts, the most important
normative system in the society. In this society the most impor-
tant normative system is clearly the religious system. Yet if we
wished to identify the legal system in the community, the norma-
tive order that fits our considered notion of the law would be the
minimal structure of enforceable norms rather than the richer re-
ligious order. To say "religion is the law of the land" is only to
speak metaphorically. After all, in many parts of the world, reli-
gious doctrine exerts as much or more practical authority in citi-
zens' lives as the civil law. Yet, this practical authority alone
cannot differentiate religious edicts from the law. We should not
assume that the law must be the most important normative sys-
tem wherever it exists. 8 1
Let us further examine Raz's jurisprudential testing ground,
the community of angels. As opposed to the society of saints, the
community of angels has no enforcement mechanism whatsoever.
Raz proposes that a community of angels would still require the
law, not to coerce members into obedience, but to coordinate
among legitimate and well-intentioned differing conceptions of
the good."8 2 What Raz illustrates is that this community would
not need the law per se, but would require a coordinating institu-
tion endowed with the power to issue authoritative edicts.8 3 This
distinction separates this article's thesis from Raz's view.
180. See HART, supra note 5, at 193; see also FINNIS, supra note 69, at 262-63 ("Pun-
ishment . . . seeks to restore the distributively just balance of advantages between the
criminal and the law-abiding, so that. . . no one should actually have been disadvantaged
... by choosing to remain within the confines of the law.").
181. Raz has noted this inclination. RAZ, supra note 70, at 116, 120 ("We would regard
an institutionalized system as a legal one only if it is necessarily in some respect the most
important institutionalized system which can exist in that society.").
182. RAZ, supra note 9, at 159. Similarly, Kant notes that even if men were perfectly
good-natured, their competing visions of the good would create instability without an ex-
ternal coordinating and coercive authority. KANT, supra note 170, at 76.
183. Andrei Marmor persuasively argues that this position may seriously underesti-
mate the need for a legal system to address coordination problems and solve prisoner's di-
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While Raz proposes that the angelic authoritative system could
easily be called law, it would be very different from what we con-
ceive of as the law." 4 Problematically, it would be impossible to
separate this system from social norms, religious norms, or any
other normative system that existed in the community and
tugged at any angel. If one (fallen) angel inexplicably decided to
disobey those edicts, the inability of any structure to even theo-
retically compel him to obey would cast serious doubt on the sys-
tem's claim to be the law. This does not diminish Raz's important
point that coercion does not fully explain legal normativity or the
law's value."' 5 But the claim is not that coercion is sufficient to
explain legal normativity, but that coercion is necessary to under-
stand the specifically legal nature of that particular normative
system. James Madison proposed that "[i]f men were angels, no
government would be necessary." ' 6 Similarly though authority
might still be required in such a perfect society, the law, strictly
speaking, would be unnecessary; put another way coercion indi-
viduates the law as a system of norms.
Some ground must be conceded to Raz's arguments. It is surely
tempting to say that if a community of angels is governed by a
system of authoritative norms that are constantly obeyed, there is
no reason not to consider theirs a system of laws. Admittedly, it is
tricky to argue that coercion should be elevated to the level of
conceptual necessity. After all, the law-unlike gold-is a social
type, not a natural kind."8 7 Thus, society could collectively under-
stand that concept in one way or another. There is little reason
why the society of angels, with an authoritative decision-making
system, could not conceptualize theirs as a system of laws.
lemma situations and problems of opportunism. See ANDREI MARMOR, POSITIVE LAW AND
OBJECTIVE VALUES 44 (2001). It is hard to understand if or how angels would be affected
by opportunism or prisoner's dilemma problems. See id. But if any society must solve pris-
oner's delimma problems, coercion becomes important and commands attention. See id.
Nevertheless, Marmor agrees with Hart and others that coercion would remain a practical
or natural, as opposed to a conceptual, necessity. See id. at 45.
184. See Lamond, supra note 3, at 46 & n.33. In this way, this view benefits from the
separation of sanctions and coercion. We can imagine individual laws without attached
sanctions, but where a purported legal system cannot ultimately compel obedience, it is
improper to consider it a legal system. Not surprisingly, Oberdiek comes to the opposite
conclusion. Oberdiek, supra note 4, at 92-93.
185. RAZ, supra note 9, at 161-62.
186. THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 349 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
187. MOORE, supra note 165, at 310; Lamond, supra note 3, at 38; Frederick Schauer,
The Social Construction of the Concept of Law: A Reply to Julie Dickson, 25 O.J.L.S. 493,
496-97 (2005).
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Say the society of saints was transitioning toward becoming the
community of angels. In year one, it possesses the minimal police
force. That police force, not surprisingly, has little to do. The fol-
lowing year, having noticed the police force sitting around playing
cards and such, the appropriate body severely cuts their budget
and reduces the force to four people and two (empty) prisons. An-
other year of no crime and other budget needs results in just one
police officer and an old barn in the countryside that can be used
as a prison if necessary. In year four, the legislature of the saints
makes no budget provision for law enforcement, the officers qui-
etly quit and the old barn is destroyed by natural disaster. By
what alchemy does the society become lawless in the fourth year?
Some will say that the normative system at any of these points
may be properly considered the law.
At first blush, the reply to this objection is purely practical.
While it is possible to simply denote this angelic normative sys-
tem as law, it is different from our concept of the law.' But to
view this as merely a pedestrian concern hides its more signifi-
cant thrust. This reply shows that lawa is at least some distance
from the concept of the law. Adopting lawa as the law would radi-
cally alter our concept of the law and replace it with a different
concept altogether. Further, this concept would lack distinctive-
ness or "fine-grained-ness"; it would be impossible to differentiate
the law from other normative systems that have competing global
and authoritative normative systems."8 9 The inability to distin-
guish lawa from other normative systems also implies that our
earlier examples do not merely rely on linguistic intuition. 190 This
indicates an embedded claim of conceptual necessity; so long as
we ascribe to our recognizable and individuated concept of the
188. This response is rooted in the traditional claim that the goal of jurisprudence is
descriptive as opposed to prescriptive. That claim states that we should describe the law
as it is, not as it could be. See JULIE DICKSON, EVALUATION AND LEGAL THEORY 43, 89
(John Gardner ed., 2001). Limiting the reply to this critique, however, sells short its claim.
189. See TONY HONORP, MAKING LAW BIND: ESSAYS LEGAL AND PHILOSOPHICAL 67-68
(1987); MAX WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY 34-35 (Guenther Roth & Claus Wittich eds.,
1968); Hans Kelsen, Professor Stone and the Pure Theory of Law, 17 STAN. L. REV. 1128
(1965) (explaining that basic norms, while giving efficiency to coercive orders, do not spe-
cifically give efficiency to the legal order); Lamond, supra note 3, at 42-43.
190. See Brian Leiter, Beyond the Hart/Dworkin Debate: The Methodology Problem in
Jurisprudence, 48 AM. J. JURIS. 17, 30-31 (2003). I am grateful to Michael Moore for his
thoughts on this issue.
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law, coercion is an inherent part of the law,1 91 not merely neces-
sary to insure compliance.'92
Conceiving of coercion as conceptually necessary in the law is
not simply a definitional stop. Our examples reveal that coercion
is one of the critical features for a normative system to be able to
claim legal status. Recall two earlier points: First, even though
society willingly obeys many normative systems that impose du-
ties above those required by the law, it is the system of coercively
enforceable duties that is properly referred to as the legal system.
Second, although people often obey the law for separate reasons,
the underlying coercion of the legal system independently pre-
cludes certain courses of action. This extends to the communities
of angels and saints. Even where the law is never violated and a
much richer system of norms is constantly observed, the minimal
layer of enforceable norms is, upon reflection, best characterized
as the law.1 93 In other words, it is not whether a system of norms
is simply obeyed but whether it is coercively enforceable that
identifies it as the law. 194
Raz's view may raise a different objection. Building on Hart's
rule of recognition, Raz's positivist model of the law proposes that
a norm qualifies as a legal norm because it emanates from a par-
ticular social source.' 95 A norm is a law if it is recognized by a so-
cially determined source of authoritative norms. l96 Does this view
alter the argument that law must be and is defined by its coer-
civeness?
No, rather the sources thesis merely pushes back one step the
question of where coercion must be located. Consider a society
with three different leaders, each claiming to be the appropriate
social source of the law. Leader A heads a group of self-appointed
persons that occupies a large stone building from which he prom-
191. Because many legal norms are incomplete or reference other legal norms, the co-
erciveness of a legal norm may depend entirely on other legal norms. Contrary to Kelsen's
view, coercion does not individuate laws; coercion individuates the law. See Lamond, supra
note 80, at 56.
192. Moore convincingly describes jurisprudential claims of necessity as related to a
different necessity claim, a claim of metaphysical necessity. MOORE, supra note 165, at
304-05. This article's claim of conceptual necessity need not go as far as Moore's claim.
193. See AUSTIN, supra note 1, at 31, 122-25, 133-35.
194. Id. at 31.
195. See RAZ, supra note 75, at 43-44.
196. See id.
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ulgates what he claims to be statutory law. Leader B leads a
large group that resembles a religion. Leader C has been ap-
pointed by the society's ancient traditions to interpret its cus-
toms. Peculiarly, all three normative systems are identical; they
are in complete agreement with each other. There may be genu-
ine ambiguity about which normative system is the legal one, but
there may also be ambiguity regarding which is the appropriate
social source of the law.197 Now imagine that each of the norma-
tive systems takes a different position on a question of first im-
pression. Leaders B and C appeal to the population's spiritual be-
liefs and traditions to require compliance with their pronounce-
ments. Leader A calls out an armed battalion to enforce his
edicts. Notice that focusing on the appropriate social source leads
to the same conclusion: the social source that can coercively en-
force its dictates conceptually fits our notion of the law."19 Inquir-
ing into the social sources merely relocates the inspection of coer-
cive force.
For the same reasons, other jurisprudential theory markers are
also insufficiently fine-grained to select a distinct notion of the
law. For example, Hart argues that when a society adopts a "rule
of recognition"-a rule about rules-that directs officials to apply
and modify the primary rules it is appropriately regarded as es-
tablishing a legal system.199 Yet, for the reasons noted in the ex-
amining the sources thesis, the rule of recognition is also insuffi-
ciently fined-grained to delineate between the two conceptions of
law above. This insufficiency is an important flaw-one that re-
veals the conceptual necessity of coercion in a description of the
law.
One objection Raz raises strikes at the heart of this picture.
Raz argues that the claim that coercion is unique to the law may
be overstated.200 Other normative systems claim authority and
employ coercion to compel members to obey their norms. For ex-
ample, the Mafia has traditionally done this. The objection is
similar to the query concerning the band of robbers who begin
taking a normative stance and employ coercion to enforce their
197. For a description of similar ambiguity, see HART, supra note 5, at 86-88.
198. To the extent the citizens of the community came to regard Leader C as the su-
preme source of norms and adopted a normative stance towards it, that stance would come
to fill other tenets of a legal system. See id. at 106-07.
199. See id. at 94-95.
200. See RAZ, supra note 9, at 149-50.
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norms. Yet these examples do not defeat the above picture of the
law. When we inspect the Mafia or the band of robbers, is not the
heart of our concern that they aspire to compete as legal sys-
tems? ' Unlike the first robber who simply ordered a person to
surrender money, when a robber believes he has a normative
right to do so and becomes something of a revolutionary. If a
group of such people retreats to a desert, adopts its own norms,
and enforces them, does not the group create a new legal sys-
tem? 20 2 For example, upon arriving on American shores, colonists
ignored the laws of the native tribes. Those tribes either did not
or could not subdue them. The colonists promulgated their own
authoritative norms backed by their own police force. It seems in-
adequate to characterize the settlers as simply acting illegally on
Native American land. It is clear that they constructed a compet-
ing legal system.2 3 As Kelsen points out, given a stable norma-
tive system backed by coercion, a band of robbers begins to repre-
sent its own state.20 4
Recognizing that coercion is a conceptual feature of law yields
the resolution necessary to individuate normative systems that
are naturally described as the law. Simultaneously, this model
clarifies important similarities between systems which can be
viewed in accord. The role of coercion in an authoritative norma-
tive system illustrates how the Mafia and other gangs are threat-
ening because they aspire to be competing legal systems.
This revelation naturally invites the question of how to treat
social norms, which may be seen as authoritative norms. Andrei
Marmor insightfully notes that there are many social groups,
with accompanying norms, to which we belong without clear con-
sent or willful participation.2 5 There are even "elaborate conven-
tions determining what is 'right' or 'proper' dress for certain occa-
sions, and people who deviate from such conventions are harshly
criticized." 2 6 Does the fact that a person finds exclusion from his
201. See RAZ, supra note 70, at 118-19.
202. Nozick notes the difficulty of distinguishing between the state's claim of sole le-
gitimate use of authority and other competing claims. NOZICK, supra note 76, at 23-24.
203. A similar description could apply to the separation of the colonial legal system
from its genesis of British law. See HART, supra note 5, at 116-18.
204. See KELSEN, supra note 7, at 47-50.
205. MARMOR, supra note 183, at 37. Dworkin makes a similar point in exploring non-
consensual associative obligations. RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 195-98 (1986).
206. MARMOR, supra note 183, at 37.
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religious or social group so psychologically terrifying that he feels
forced to obey the group's rules make those rules coercive (and
coupled with the normativity and authority, law-like)?
This is a difficult question. We have already seen that Austin's
claim that social sanctions cannot be regarded as the law because
they do not emanate from a political superior is unsatisfying.
20 7
Unlike Marmor, however, understanding that the law is not
merely involuntary, but is coercive, reveals a distinction between
powerful social norms and the law. The tentative answer is lo-
cated somewhere in the discussion, promoted by Aristotle, con-
cerning coercion and independent external reasons. 0 8 A person's
decision to regard as necessary the esteem of his friends or social
peers seems closer to a set of personal reasons from which he may
opt out than those reasons that are imposed regardless of his re-
lationship. Simply, a person must, at least in some sense, choose
to value the esteem of his friends. Recall Aristotle's distinctions in
determining what constitutes coercion°-the desire to be in-
cluded in a social network is a desire that originates from
within.210 By contrast, the coercive force the law wields is exter-
nal and can be imposed on a person aside from whether he holds
the law in any particular regard. This lack of an opt-out feature
may be critical.
This may be overly simplistic. Perhaps humans are not consti-
tutionally the kind of creatures who can simply turn their backs
on their social needs. Even if they could, it is not clear that one
can opt out of all socially important constraints; nearly everyone
needs something from the society of their fellow man. Thus, the
proposed model may clarify that, at a certain point, socially im-
posed coercion represents the law in some sense. If the violation
of an authoritative norm on a desert island results in social ban-
ishment, which would lead to certain death, the norm may consti-
tute law, regardless of how else it was described. Alternatively,
this may indicate that the proposed model is incomplete; it has
been argued that coercion, along with normativity and authority,
207. AUSTIN, supra note 1, at 121-24.
208. See supra text accompanying notes 116-18.
209. See 2 ARISTOTLE, Nicomachean Ethics, in THE COMPLETE WORKS OF ARISTOTLE
1729, 1752-54 (Jonathan Barnes ed., 1984).
210. See id. at 1778.
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are necessary only to delineate law. This example may indicate
why these features are likely insufficient to describe law.211
Grant Lamond's recent work on the role of coercion in the law
strongly resonates with this article's picture of the law. Lamond
notes that the law is a system of norms.2 12 Moreover, he points
out that the law claims authority to regulate a person's practical
reasoning to the exclusion of other norms and does so over the en-
tire range of one's actions; that is the law is globally normative
and authoritative.2 3 Further, Lamond in agreement with this ar-
ticle, proposes that the existence of sanctions, without more, does
not render the law coercive,214 and the conceptual role of coercion
is not restricted to the pragmatic matter of its effectiveness. 21 5
Still, Lamond denies that coercion is fundamentally constitu-
tive of the law or individuates the law from other global norma-
tive systems. 1 6 Rather, he sees coercion as tied to the law's claim
of practical authority.1 7 Law claims the right to command a per-
son's practical reasoning and the right to change his normative
position. 2" The law's claim to authority is made outside its coer-
cive ability, but the law further claims the right to enforce its
claim to authority. 219 Thus, on Lamond's view, the claim of au-
thority is a justificatory link to the coercive force of the law.22°
While Lamond believes it is possible to describe the law as coer-
cive because it claims this right,22' this need not be so. He pro-
poses that the coerciveness of the law ultimately depends on
whether the threat is realistic.222 Lamond finally concludes that
the unique feature of the law is that it claims this authority over
an indeterminate range of reasons; it is a global, authoritative,
normative structure.223
211. Raz's early attempts to draw such distinctions are helpful, but not fully satisfac-
tory. See RAZ, supra note 11, at 150-51; RAZ, supra note 9, at 154-62.
212. See Lamond, supra note 3, at 50-51.
213. See id. at 55.
214. See Lamond, supra note 80, at 57.
215. Lamond, supra note 3, at 48.
216. See id. at 55.
217. Id. at 54; Lamond, supra note 80, at 39.
218. See Lamond, supra note 3, at 54.
219. See id. at 55.
220. Id.
221. See id. at 56.
222. Id.
223. See id. at 57.
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Lamond's justificatory, rather than constitutive, conception of
the law results in a more attenuated role of coercion. For exam-
ple, in dismissing coercion as simply pragmatically necessary in
the law, Lamond suggests that the law could authorize coercive
enforcement by other social institutions.224 He points out that
other social norms can attach sanctions to legal violations
(shame, ostracism, etc.) that independently reinforce legal
norms.225 But Lamond's own claim, that the law can authorize en-
forcement by other institutions, is stronger. He posits that be-
cause the law could outsource its coercive enforcement to private
groups or institutions, the law and its coercive enforcement are
separable.226
It is hard to conceptualize Lamond's claim that the law could
authorize other forcible measures, such as private violence, to en-
force compliance with legal norms without internalizing that
force.227 If the legal violation authorizes coercive force against
someone to enforce its sanctions, rather than for immediate re-
pulsion (e.g., self-defense),228 that authorization and attendant
enforcement would be part and parcel of the legal system. If the
violation of a legal norm results in the permitted enforcement
through coercive force by an organized mob, that group would be,
a police force, in a real sense, a police force. Certainly the natural
view would consider this a compound enforcement or police sys-
tem. These norms that claimed authority would be completed by
the authorized enforcement or would establish a competing legal
system. As previously noted in touching upon the Mafia, where
the violation results in coercive force within the system, the pre-
cise threat is the rise of a dual legal system.229 Similarly, where
the legal system only authorizes but does not require the use of
coercive force to vindicate a legal right, the optional nature of
that right does not erase the underlying coercion. Tort law, after
all, only grants to an injured party the right to appeal to the law
224. See id. at 48, 57.
225. See id. at 47.
226. See id. at 55-56.
227. See id.
228. Private citizens' abilities to "enforce" legal norms in very small circumstances,
most notably self-defense, do not undermine this contention. In the case of self-defense the
legal enforcement mechanism is meant to be enforced by other legal enforcement mecha-
nisms, such as police protection. In this way, self-defense is supplemental, or complemen-
tary, to other legal enforcement.
229. See KELSEN, supra note 7, at 47-50.
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to enforce a claim, but none doubt that once granted that claim is
coercively enforced by the legal system.23 °
On the whole, Lamond's explanation is certainly convincing,
but it is peculiar to stop where he does, denying that the law is
inherently coercive. The conclusion that coercion is linked to the
law merely because the law uses its claim of authority to justify
coercion seems insufficiently fine-grained to isolate the legal sys-
tem. Not all global normative systems claim the right to enforce
their authoritative demands. For example, many religious norms
are viewed as valuable precisely because a person must willingly
commit to their normative guidance. The Catholic church explic-
itly claims that its normative authority extends over certain por-
tions of human moral life, but leaves other realms of its subjects'
lives to be regulated by positive law.2 31 Other normative systems,
however, claim the right to enforce their demands. Religious zeal-
ots or cultural traditionalists claim that their respective norma-
tive systems are global, authoritative and fully justify violence or
coercion to enforce their edicts. To the extent those norms are not
enforced or enforceable, Lamond's thesis does not provide any
way to identify the system of norms that provides legal rights.232
That a would-be king claims his norms justify coercion without
coercive enforcement does not turn those norms into the law.
Finally, the law's authority is not used merely to justify coer-
cion. While other normative systems claim to be justified in using
coercion, they simply do not, or cannot, effectively use coercion to
enforce this authority. Thus, it is not the justificatory link, but
the coercion itself that makes the law distinctive. This is simply a
roundabout way of capturing the earlier arguments-coercion is
constitutive of the law. Coercion transforms authoritative, global,
normative systems and puts them in contention to be legal sys-
tems. The law may not be reducible to coercion, but coercion
turns certain norms into legal norms.233
230. I am grateful to Scott Shapiro for raising this issue.
231. See John Finnis, Religion and State: Some Main Issues and Sources, 51 AM. J. JU-
RIS. 107, 120 (2006).
232. Lamond, following Kelsen, may distinguish these unenforced claims on the basis
of their effectiveness. See Lamond, supra note 3, at 56.
233. Coercion turns these types of norms into candidates for legal norms, though the
ultimate judgment may turn on other competing and dominating legal systems.
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VII. OF JURISPRUDENCE AND CONCEPTUAL ANALYSIS
The argument that coercion is inherent in the law relies on two
interlocking contentions. First, between an authoritative norma-
tive system that is obeyed without coercion and one that can be
coercively enforced, the coercive system that intuitively matches
our considered judgments about the law. Second, without noting
that coercion introduces a distinction between the two systems,
we lack the conceptual granularity to distinguish two separate
concepts. We can no longer discern the law from other normative
systems and we lose a distinct concept.
These two arguments depend on premises that are under seri-
ous attack in philosophy and jurisprudence. Specifically, Brian
Leiter has recently prosecuted the very approach of conceptual
analysis in jurisprudence.234 He builds his arguments on W.V.
Quine's attack of the idea that some things are inherently true-
analytic truths-as opposed to concepts that are only true in light
of contingent facts-synthetic truths.235 Leiter indicts the idea
that a person can conduct, without serious explanation, the juris-
prudential project of identifying inherent truths about the law.2 36
Put much too simply, Quine attacked the distinction between
analytic and synthetic truths, arguing that these were based on
sociohistoric facts-suppositions held onto with greater or lesser
conviction at different historical moments.2 37 Leiter further in-
dicts the idea that stable intuitions across time and cultures can
be used to distinguish these concepts.23
These are powerful arguments and deserve attention that will
have to wait until another day. I mentioned earlier that concep-
tual analysis would not be deeply defended here, so a few words
will have to serve as a place holder. As important as Quine's work
has been, it is hardly uncontroversial.2 39 But more immediate for
234. See Leiter, supra note 190, at 43-44.
235. Id. at 44; see W.V. Quine, Two Dogmas of Empiricism, 60 PHIL. REV. 20, 34 (1951).
236. See Leiter, supra note 190, at 43-44.
237. See Quine, supra note 235, at 20.
238. See Leiter, supra note 190, at 24-27, 50.
239. Among the powerful rebuttals is Grice and Strawson's argument that undermin-
ing the distinction between analyticity and co-extension would in turn undermine the idea
that sentences have meaning. See generally PAUL GRICE & P.F. STRAWSON, In Defense of a
Dogma, in STUDIES IN THE WAY OF WORDS 196 (1989). After all, the reason one believes
that there are good and bad translations of one language into another is because we be-
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our purposes, it is not clear that this jurisprudential project "de-
pends upon a robust conception of the analytic/synthetic distinc-
tion."241 In particular, it is not claimed that this article's distinc-
tions are metaphysically true. Because the law is not a natural
kind that exists outside of human societies, it is not clear what it
would mean for these distinctions to be metaphysically true. Con-
cepts do not turn on every person's subjective understanding, but
neither are they mind independent. This article proceeds on the
weaker version of the analytic/synthetic claim, conceptual neces-
sity-certain features are true in light of the role they play in
shaping, distinguishing, and explaining concepts we share.241 Fi-
nally, depending on how much one concedes that these concepts
are true because they are shared and distinguishable concepts, it
is not clear that there needs to be a great tension between this
form of conceptual analysis and Leiter's naturalism.
242
VIII. COERCION AND THE LEGAL LANDSCAPE
I hope to have painted a simple but compelling picture of the
law. The law does not issue orders, but promulgates norms. These
norms claim to be authoritative; they present exclusionary rea-
sons for acting. Finally, the law is intrinsically coercive. Without
coercion, a normative system cannot be differentiated or under-
stood as the law.
This picture of the law has consequences for recasting the cur-
rent legal landscape. Notably, it excludes from the law those sys-
tems of norms that aspire to legal status but lack coercive en-
forceability. Much of the distinction drawn here will remain
confined to theoretical musings. On rare occasions, however, a le-
gal problem illustrates philosophical questions nicely. One exam-
ple is in the Western Sahara case before the International Court
of Justice. 243 The court rendered an advisory opinion regarding
whether the precursor to the modern state of Algiers belonged to
lieve that sentences have meanings that can be conveyed more or less correctly. See id. at
201.
240. John Oberdiek & Dennis Patterson, Moral Evaluation and Conceptual Analysis in
Jurisprudential Methodology, in 10 LAW AND PHILOSOPHY: CURRENT LEGAL ISSUES 2007,
at 60, 72 (Michael Freeman & Ross Harrison eds., 2007).
241. See id. at 74.
242. See id. at 75.
243. Western Sahara, Advisory Opinion, 1975 I.C.J. 12 (Oct. 16).
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any people at the time of Spanish colonization and, if not,
whether it had special legal ties with any state at the time. 244 The
court decided that the organized tribes occupied the territory and
had legal ties to the territory through various treaties, 245 but the
separate opinion of Judge Dillard is most interesting.246 Judge
Dillard concurred that the presence of organized tribes was suffi-
cient to establish that the territory was not terra nullius, but un-
derstood that this was insufficient to establish whether any ties
the tribes established were legal ties.247 Deciding that the tribes
had created legal ties required determining what special charac-
teristics rendered certain ties properly legal.24
Judge Dillard noted that law must exert some normative pull-
over its subjects. Moreover, that normative pull must in some
sense be felt as authoritative or a "deferential obligation. '' 249 As
Judge Dillard pointed out, although the primary reason for com-
pliance need not be the fear of sanctions, in order to be properly
labeled legal more was needed than what was commonly or per-
vasively felt.25 ° Thus, Judge Dillard consciously attempted to dif-
ferentiate legal ties from those "based on religious, cultural, eth-
nic, linguistic or other factors." 21 His test seems imprecise; those
other norms are often felt persuasively and regarded with defer-
ence, too. Judge Dillard sought and missed that legal norms must
also be enforceable, indeed coercively so, to complete his analy-
sis.2
52
244. Id. at 14.
245. Id. at 39.
246. See id. at 116 (separate opinion of Judge Dillard).
247. Id. at 124.
248. Id. at 125.
249. Id. ("[TIhe evidence must support the view that the inhabitants of the territory
had a sense that the wishes of the Sultan or the Emir [the sovereign] (however expressed
and by whatever investiture of authority) not only 'should' be obeyed out of a feeling of re-
ligious affiliation or courtesy, but 'must' be obeyed out of a sense of deferential obligation.
This sense of obligation need not be inspired by the fear of sanctions, nevertheless it must
exist in the sense of being pervasively felt as part of the way of life of the people. The point
is that it is this quality which, at least intellectually, differentiates a tie based on reli-
gious, cultural, ethnic, linguistic or other factors from one that is legal.").
Dillard also correctly rejects the conception that the appropriate test for what is consid-
ered a legal test depends on whether the obligation felt is owed to a secular or religious
power. See id. at 125-26.
250. See id. at 125.
251. Id.
252. This is not to deny that there are difficulties we miss in the normal case of pin-
pointing the transitions in the phenomena of a legal system coming into being, evolving
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Depending on the details presented to Judge Dillard-
particularly whether the norms he examined could be enforced-
the constitutive theory of law proposed here would clarify the nor-
mative system at issue as pre-legal or quasi legal. I hasten to add
that the cultures here labeled "pre-legal" certainly do not deserve
any less respect or have less substantial interests.253 (Such a view
only reflects parochial arrogance.)
This view presents challenges that manifest themselves re-
peatedly in the legal world. Some international law must be ex-
cluded as truly legal. Many international law regimes, to the ex-
tent they lack enforceability, are difficult to distinguish from
norms that could be proposed by a religious institution, a school,
or a person's group of friends. The players-and certainly the ex-
pertise-are different, but the norms remain aspirational. The
norms depend on their moral attractiveness for force and are no
different from many promulgated normative systems, which do
not coercively bind those meant to be its subjects. This is true to
the extent that these international legal norms are not enforce-
able by the legal apparatus of the individual member states. In-
ternational law certainly qualifies as a legal regime to the extent
international law regimes are increasingly binding through the
enforcement apparatus of the individual member states.254
IX. CONCLUSIONS IN JURISPRUDENCE AND POLITICAL THEORY
In concluding, let us examine whether we can locate any profit
in the preceding effort. What, after all, hangs on a theory of the
law that elevates coercion to a conceptual necessity in law? The
prior argument produced at least two valuable insights. The con-
stitutive theory of the law creates a thin account of the law, but
an account that nonetheless requires certain features for a nor-
mative system to be considered the law. Much of jurisprudence
has been preoccupied for the last few generations with exploring
and maturing and then decaying and passing away. Cf. HART, supra note 5, at 112-13
(discussing private citizens' internal reasons for obeying the law and external pressures
from courts to aid in that obedience).
253. It is parochial arrogance to imagine that only legal relationships define a society
or are the primary marker of its worth or advancement.
254. See Ward Ferdinandusse, Out of the Black-Box? The International Obligation of
State Organs, 29 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 45, 53 (2003) (explaining that there is a growing trend
toward international obligations binding member states).
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the truth conditions of legal propositions. This debate has, in
large part, centered on the tension between the positivist model
presented in this article and Dworkin's interpretivist model.
Much ink has been spilled on the subject and hoping that one can
shed new light on the subject may evidence boundless optimism.
Still, defining coercion as an essential feature of the law offers a
novel view in this long-running debate.
To appreciate why Dworkin's interpretivist model is so compel-
ling, it is crucial to understand how it differs from the positivist
model and why understanding the law as essentially coercive may
reveal that Dworkin's model is mistaken. Dworkin's conception of
the law is, first and foremost, an integrative model. Under
Dworkin's view, one cannot understand the law as determined by
a social rule that recognizes an authoritative source of law, or
composed of rules moderated by or in competition with principles.
Law is, rather, seen as a particular model of morality: legal mo-
rality.255 The analogy bears explaining. It would be impossible to
suppose that moral reasoning is subject to separate rules, stan-
dards and principles. Instead, moral reasoning uses rules because
they are believed to stand for propositions about moral truths.256
Moral rules are, however, constantly subject to inspection and
justification by the principles upon which they rely. They must be
examined in their application to moral conflicts to arrive at the
correct view of our moral duties.5 7
Likewise, legal rules gain their force from the norms embedded
in legal values.25 Put simply, Dworkin proposes that the very
truth of propositions of law-legal rights and obligations-are de-
rived from a certain type of political-moral reasoning.259 Law, so
understood, creates rights and obligations that-exist by virtue of
the background political rights and morality of every legal sys-
tem. This background morality includes past legal decisions as
well as other attendant political values such as integrity, fair-
ness, equality and liberty. Truth propositions of law are the most
morally attractive propositions that correctly determine and
weigh all competing political moral reasons determining the ap-
255. Cf. DWORKIN, supra note 54, at 240-58.
256. I am ignoring the sophistications surrounding utilitarianism generally and rule
utilitarianism in particular.
257. See DWORKIN, supra note 54, at 57-58.
258. See id. at 293.
259. See id. at 68, 102-04, 129.
2008] 1249
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
propriate legal rights.26 ° Thus, Dworkin's conclusion: "[A] princi-
ple is a principle of law if it figures in the soundest theory of law
that can be provided as a justification for the explicit substantive
and institutional rules of the jurisdiction in question. 261
Dworkin seeks to illustrate how one arrives at true conclusions
of law by reasoning about what political morality requires. For
Dworkin, this definition of law is criterial. A proposition is law if
the proposition is the morally best explanation of all the legal
rules, decisions and principles in a legal system. True proposi-
tions of law necessarily turn on and are derived from one's politi-
cal moral rights. Hence, Dworkin's famously misunderstood state-
ment, "Jurisprudence is the general part of adjudication.... 262
At first blush Dworkin's model seems irreconcilably distant
from the positivist model. For Dworkin, that legal principles are
binding on judges is revealed by examining the role of judicial
reasoning in deciding legal cases. The positivist tenet that legal
duties exist only by virtue of a recognized social practice-a rule
of recognition-Dworkin argues, miscasts the thinking of judges
in arriving at a decision concerning legal rights.263 No judge imag-
ines that where conventionally defined duties run out so too does
the law, leaving him free to "trot off" and make his decision ac-
cording to his own tastes.264 Rather, judges reason from principles
260. See id. at 81, 116.
261. Id. at 66, 340; see DWORKIN, supra note 205, at 90.
262. DWORKIN, supra note 205, at 90. One clarification is necessary. By proposing that
legal rights are "implicit" in background morality, Dworkin does not mean that true propo-
sitions of law exist in some metaphysical sense awaiting discovery. See DWORKIN, supra
note 54, at 293. Rather, legal rights are derived from political morality. Saying these
rights are embedded is merely a metaphorical way of expressing that they derive through
the correct determination of political moral reasons. See id. at 112-13, 115-17, 293, 326.
If this casting of the Dworkinian thesis is correct, then certain early responses crafted
against it fail. They cast the role of legal principles as either vague summaries or "actual"
legal rules. See Raz, supra note 41, at 825-29. Nor can this picture be reduced to a hybrid
or two-tiered picture of law, where legal rules are first consulted and legal principles serve
an adjudicative function when these are indeterminate. See Joseph Raz, Dworkin: A New
Link in the Chain, 74 CAL. L. REV. 1103, 1107-09 (1986) (reviewing RONALD DWORKIN, A
MATTER OF PRINCIPLE (1995)).
This formulation misses Dworkin's point that principles cannot be treated as though ex-
traneous to the law. Principles instead are part of the law and, in fact, properly weighed,
generate legal rights. See DWORKIN, supra note 54, at 24-25, 64-68, 79. It will not suffice
to suppose that principles merely summarize legal rules or are applied where they are in-
determinate. Of course, these were very early responses and Raz's critiques have grown
more sophisticated.
263. See DWORKIN, supra note 54, at 112.
264. See id.
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of political morality in law to tease out legally binding rights.2 65
Hence, Dworkin proposes, the principles of political morality are
binding law.
Yet the most sophisticated positivist models do not deny that
moral principles play a role in determining legal rights. For ex-
ample, while Raz disputes that a legal rule can be valid contin-
gent on its moral virtue as such, he recognizes that moral princi-
ples may be incorporated into a legal system by virtue of their
social pedigree.2 66 If a legal rule incorporates a moral virtue such
as "fairness" into the conditions of a contract, validity turns on
brute facts, not on whether the contract is in "moral fact" fair-
but that it is so declared by the appropriate social sources. 267
This position does not commit Raz to the view that legal rea-
soning is an insulated form of reasoning-technical and hermeti-
cally sealed reasoning-obeying its own logic.268 This formalist
doctrine ignores the fact that on any view conflicting values and
goals within the law cannot be settled exclusively by legal rules.
The law must supplement legal standards with other reasons.269
When this occurs, judges are directed by the law to engage in the
best moral reasoning they can. This does not mean these moral
precepts are part of the law, for the law may bind judges to apply
reasons that fall outside the body of the law itself. It does mean
that, in any positivist conception, applying legal rights brings the
law into contact with morality.270 Further, for Raz, the moral
benefits of maintaining the law's authoritative ability provide the
265. See id. at 117.
266. See RAZ, supra note 40, at 213-15, 234.
267. See id. at 231, 234. Raz's view of the role of principles in the law is driven by his
conceptualization of law as authoritative. The function of law is to mediate between people
and their reasons for actions. Law must present to people new reasons that displace the
reasons on which they are dependent. If law resorted to pure moral argument, it would be
unable to generate new reasons, which would send people back to their dependent reasons
for acting. Note that Raz's view does not depend on the contention that moral reasons are
more controversial than non-moral reasons. Rather, it rests on the conceptual claim that
placing validity on underlying moral reasons simply does not report any new reasons for
acting.
268. JOSEPH RAz, The Obligation to Obey: Revision and Tradition, in ETHICS IN THE
PUBLIC DOMAIN, supra note 40, at 325, 330-34.
269. See id. at 331 (explaining three situations in which individuals feel obligated to
obey laws based on non-legal reasons).
270. This is often ignored due to misunderstanding the implications of the "separation
thesis." See H.L.A. HART, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, in ESSAYS IN
JURISPRUDENCE AND PHILOSOPHY 49, 57 (1983).
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justification for separating the reasoning of the courts from direct
moral reasoning.
While philosophical differences are sometimes of importance
and often of interest, it is striking to note how close these models
become when they are fleshed out. 271 Dworkin objects to the posi-
tivist's tenets on the grounds that, without admitting that politi-
cal moral principles are a part of the law, the rights of claimants
are "out of court" and must rely on the judge's discretion. Yet in
the Razian model, judges are equally bound by law to determine
legal rights through sound moral reasoning. The difference be-
tween judges being bound by the law to delineate legal rights and
those rights being a part of the law seems ever slighter.272
While the positivist model Raz and others proposed preserves
some distinction from Dworkin's, a model that highlights the role
of coercion brings this distinction into starker relief. Recognizing
coercion as an inherent part of the law reveals how Dworkin's in-
sistence that legal principles are binding may force us to speak in
peculiar ways. Imagine a legal system where we know the princi-
ples of legality forbid the death penalty. Suddenly and inexplica-
bly, a law is passed that authorizes it. The law is recognized and,
critically for my thesis, enforced. Here, Dworkin's model forces us
not only to say that the condemned person's rights are being vio-
lated but the law itself is invalid, that the police and other agen-
271. See Michael S. Moore, Four Reflections on Law and Morality, 48 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 1523, 1529 (2007).
272. Perhaps it is best to examine a fundamental objection underlying the positivist's
position that remains even after finding a place for political moral principles in the law,
and contrast it with the Dworkinian model. One must not be confused and think that the
inclusion of political morality in the law secures a moral outcome. Under either model,
even if the judge reasons perfectly to deduce the legal rights within a jurisdiction, those
rights still may not reach a moral ideal (indeed, they may be immoral), even in systems
that fall well short of being "wicked" systems of law. As Hart reminds us,
It does not follow that, because . . . a decision [is] intelligently reached by ref-
erence to some conception of what ought to be, we have a junction of law and
morals. We must.., beware of thinking in a too simple-minded fashion about
the word "ought". ... The word "ought" merely reflects the presence of some
standard of criticism; one of these standards is a moral standard, but not all
standards are moral.
HART, supra note 270, at 69. The background morality of a jurisdiction may be far from
our reflective moral standards, and deciding cases by their standards may remain offen-
sive to our total sensibilities-after all, even wicked games have rules by which one must
delineate the "rights" of the game. It is the need to maintain our critical moral view of the
law, though acknowledged by all, that the positivist is keen to bring to the fore. See id. at
72-75; see also DWORKIN, supra note 54, at 352; Dworkin, supra note 205, at 79. See gen-
erally Jeremy Waldron, All We Like Sheep, 12 CAN. J. L. & JUR. 169 (1999).
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cies are acting illegally. When taken literally it does seem odd. Is
it not more accurate to describe the circumstances as due to an
odious law? Here, recognizing that the law is the normative sys-
tem that claims authority and is being coercively enforced gives a
clearer account of the prevailing legal system. Dworkin's model
would hold that such legislation would (at least until such time
had passed that the political morality had conformed itself) be in
contradiction with the law. Dworkin has gone so far as to pro-
nounce that such propositions are nonsensical, for they would en-
tail holding that the values of legality prohibited something while
the law allowed it.
Dworkin's model, however, is not an incoherent way of speak-
ing. We recognize, in certain cases, that our political-legal rights
have been violated. Indeed, such rhetoric is often used to capture
the depth of our outrage. These pronouncements are frequently
bolstered by a particular reading of a supervening legal stan-
dard-for instance, the Constitution or the Bill of Rights-but
may also be made when one pronounces recognized law invalid in
light of precepts of political morality. Yet sometimes, when we
ask after the law, we wish to know the true propositions that are
authoritatively binding on social institutions before we ask about
the value they possess or embody. Hart points out that this is one
of the most powerful tools the positivist account gives us.
Dworkin himself has recognized that even when we speak of
thoroughly normative values we sometimes inquire after a largely
value-free account, which he refers to as the "flat sense" of a
value.273 To do so we must sometimes be ready to say not that
something is not a law, but that it is a bad law. This challenge is
strongest exactly where the positivist makes his stand: where a
law violates our prior precepts of political morality.274
273. See RONALD DWORKIN, SOVEREIGN VIRTUE: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF
EQUALITY 125-26 (2000).
274. Further, though this thesis makes a claim that some level of understanding of law
must be objective, the thin theory proposed here takes no further position on whether law
can be wholly understood without a meta-moral analysis. Moreover, one may be interested
in pre-legal and quasi-legal systems that fall short of the constitutive theory proposed
here, for they, too, play important roles in human society. Additionally, legal philosophy
gives us rich and varied ways of understanding the function of law. In this respect, every-
thing from Marxist theory and current Critical theory, to Oberdiek's valuable observation
that in many respects, law allows one to organize constructively his life, constitutes the
splendid battleground of philosophy. Again, this article does not attempt to instruct us on
how to view the many different ways of understanding the functions of law. It does, how-
ever, insist on a particular understanding on what fully counts as law.
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Certainly philosophical clarity is valuable unto itself. The law
is an important human institution and thus we are properly
driven to further clarify its inherent features. But a model of law
that highlights the law's inherently coercive nature offers us
much besides philosophical clarity. Indeed, highlighting the law's
coerciveness makes vivid once again why the analytical jurispru-
dence question of what constitutes law matters so greatly. Coer-
cion is a concept that engages our moral faculties in a variety of
ways. Even between those who argue that law is or is not intrin-
sically coercive, one common thing is clear: coercion demands a
justification of the coercive act itself. 75 Indeed, some view the jus-
tification of the law's coercive nature as the fundamental motiva-
tion of legal philosophy.276
Because coercion attempts to eliminate some portion of a per-
son's options or liberties, it often appears as a prima facie evil.
Moreover, quite apart from the value of the option eliminated (for
that may be trivial) coercion demands justification because of the
way that it treats people. Coercing someone invades his auton-
omy, attempting to decide for him how he may or may not act.
Thus, the law's inherent coercion places law under a unique
moral burden-a burden of justification that is distinct from the
burden of justification that rests with other normative systems.
Whereas it may be no small feat to establish a robust justification
for the normative system of a particular church because that sys-
tem is voluntary (to a much larger extent than law), the require-
ment for justification is decidedly different than that for the law.
The law must be justified in a way that other normative systems
may not be. Further, the fact that the law's coercion is involun-
tarily imposed on an entire community-one whose members may
hold vastly different conceptions of fundamental principles-
limits the type ofjustificatory reasons to which the law must con-
form. The underlying recognition of this involuntary imposition
may motivate liberal scholars to demand that reasons grounding
legal force be accessible to all reasonable persons-that they be
based in public reasons.
Ultimately, the moral requirement of justifying the law's coer-
civeness-its restriction on the type of reasons that may properly
275. See Edmundson, supra note 97, at 87-88, 90-91; Lamond, supra note 80, at 40;
Oberdiek, supra note 4, at 80-81.
276. See DWORKIN, supra note 205, at 93.
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justify the law-is linked to nothing less than the need to justify
a full-fleshed political theory. And while I cannot begin here to
sketch a viably justified political theory, highlighting the coer-
civeness of law lets us know the boundaries such a justification
must respect and the burden it must carry. If coercion is built
into the very nature of law, then so is the need for justification.
More important because law's coercive nature differs from other
relationships that may compel or restrain one's actions-for in-
stance, personal and communal relationships-law must be justi-
fied in unique ways. Understanding law as coercive, then, may
show that these important restrictions on reasons that can be
used to justify legal force may be built into the very nature of law.
It is no trivial proposition to imagine that a legal system by its
nature must conform to certain (liberal?) reasons to be justified.
This does not imply that coercion cannot be justified or that it
even should be seen as antithetical to power being used justly.
Kant and many others have noted that coercion may be used-
indeed may be necessary-as a tool of justice in securing the
greatest amount of reciprocal freedom for all.277 Still, just as
Oberdiek hoped to highlight the liberating features of law by
questioning whether it must always be coercive, by bringing coer-
cion to the fore of our concept of law we remind ourselves of the
dangerous power of law. The law claims to be the supreme nor-
mative system in our practical reasoning. This claim must be
vigilantly challenged and, in light of the coerciveness of law, con-
tinuously justified.
277. See, e.g., KANT, supra note 170, at 35-36.
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